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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
If the Bankruptcy Clause slipped without significant debate into our
Constitution,1 its legislative application proved endlessly controversial for
a century thereafter. Before finally implementing a permanent regimen of
bankruptcy relief in 1898,2 Congress generated three abortive systems 3
from a debate as heated and philosophically far-reaching as those
addressing monetary policy, the tariff, or the two Banks of the United
States, in the process tracing with unequaled precision the nation's basic
political faultlines. 4 Bankruptcy proved so divisive because it was
perceived by Americans as emblematic of a fundamental issue of economic
identity: the expansion and consolidation of the capitalist presence in
American life.
If de Tocqueville's "new model man," the American, was always a child
of the commercial revolution, 5 a national consensus favoring untrammeled
economic freedom concealed a deep conflict of expectation as to what manner
of polity would result. One tradition of thought, consistent in its basic elements
* Attorney, Branch Chief, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange
Commission; B.A., University of California at Davis, 1975; J.D., Loyola Law School of
Los Angeles, 1982; S.J.D., Harvard Law School, 1992.
I wish to express my gratitude to Vern Countryman (professor emeritus) and Morton J.
Horwitz, Harvard Law School, and Thomas A. Green, Michigan School of Law, for
helpful comments on an earlier incarnation of this Article, and to the Mark DeWolfe Howe
Fund, Harvard Law School, for its financial support.
I Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT.
215 (1957).
2 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). The Act was subsequently
amended on a number of occasions and eventually supplanted by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). It was permanent, however, in the
sense that it established the outlines of the system that remains with us today.
3 The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867); The Bankruptcy Act of
1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841); The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800).
4 DREW R. McCoy, THE ELusIvE REPuBuc: PoUIcAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN
AMERICA 179 (1980); F.R. Noel, A History of the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States
Constitution, 181 (1920) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America).
5 On the commercial dynamic of the new republic, see JoYCE APPLEBY, CAPrTAusM
AND A NEw SociAL ORDER: THE REPUBUCAN VISION OF THE 1790s (1984), and GEORG
WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 84-87 (J. Sibree, trans., 1956).
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over many decades, proposed an American society intensive in its development,
rapidly progressing toward commercial and industrial maturity. This view
emphasized the role of accumulative activity as "the life and spring of the
health of a nation," 6 to which our national prosperity was "principally owing."
It presented market capitalism, with its restless, expansive energy,7 as the
driving wheel of our collective "progress," a term encompassing material
prosperity, technical development, education, and expanded cultural activities:
in short "the spirit of improvement... abroad upon the earth." 8 Those of this
persuasion, many drawn from the mercantile and professional classes, were
willing to permit (and indeed to encourage through government action) the
increased aggregation of private capital as an instrument of national
development. 9 This ideology found its first and perhaps purest political
expression in Hamiltonian federalism. Later, the Whig Party of Henry Clay
and the postbeilum Republican Party of McKinley adopted its basic tenets.
An alternative tradition of thought, commonly designated "republican" and
identified primarily with the agricultural sector, advocated extensive
development: a socially and economically stable nation of small producers
opening ever-new territories to cultivation. 10 To republicans, the yeoman
6 Tennessee campaign newspaper quoted in JOHN AsHWORTH, 'AGRARiANS' AND
'AISTOCRATS': PARTY PoLIICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE UNrED STATES, 1837-1846, at 73
(1983); 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1097-98 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wood); see also, 38
ANNALS OF CONG. 1230 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Cushman); LAWRENCE F. KOHL, THE
PoLrrics OF INDIVIDUALISM: PARTIES AND THE AMERiCAN CHARACTER IN THE JACKSONIAN
ERA 119 (1989); LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
PASTORAL IDEAL IN AMEmCA 168 (1964); Hon. Daniel Barnard, Commerce as Connected
with the Progress of Civilization, 1 HuNT's MERCHANTS' MAG. 3 (1839).
7 Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653, 656 (1889).
8 John Quincy Adams, First Annual Message, in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 865, 882 (James D. Richardson ed., New York, Bureau of
National Literature 1897).
9 See ASUWORTH, supra note 6, at 1; HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE
Poics OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 76 (1990); Norman K. Risjord, The Virginia Federalists,
33 J.S. HST. 486 (1967).
10 Republicanism as the rhetoric of opposition to capitalism had its wellsprings in the
Country-party thought of late seventeenth century England. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACmAvELUAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLmCAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLAenc
REPUBIUCAN TRADTON (1975). It was transplanted to America during the eighteenth
century to become profoundly influential in the cause of independence. See generally
BERARD BAILYN, TH IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMEmCAN REVOLUTION (1967);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1972). For a
variety of viewpoints on the influence of republicanism through the early national period,
see Joyce Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q., 3d Ser.,
20 (1986); Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in
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farmer, immune to the vice-inducing luxury and free of the economic
dependency that together characterize the minions of commerce, pursues a
vocation that develops his mind, his morals, and indeed, his full humanity. He
thus stands uniquely positioned to promote the "virtue" of the polity. 1
Merchants and finance capitalists, by contrast, were seen by republicans as
parasites who drop their buckets into wells dug by others. As mere paper
wealth, their profits represent no increase in real economic product that might
benefit society at large. 12 Unbounded by any connection to honest labor, their
profits could accrue to such a level as to enable the capitalist sector to upset the
delicate counterpoise of interests that sustain a free and virtuous social order,
and substitute a morally vacuous dynamic of market transactions and profit
calculations that respects the social identity of neither person nor property. 13
the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q., 3d Ser., 3 (1986); Colin Gordon,
Crafting a Usable Past: Consensus, Ideology and Historians of the American Revolution, 46
WM. & MARY Q., 3d Ser., 671 (1989); Issac Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion":
The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q., 3d Ser., 3 (1988); Robert E.
Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q., 3d
Ser., 334 (1982); Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of
an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q., 3d
Ser., 49 (1972).
11 This was a fundamental element of republican thought of all eras. See, e.g.,
ARIsrrLE, THE PoLmcs bk. 7, ch. 9; H.T. DICKINsON, LmERTY AND PROPERTY:
PoImcAL IDEOLOGY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 150 (1977); Thomas Jefferson,
"Query XIX," Manufactures, in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 165 (William Peden ed.,
1955); RUSsELL KIRK, RANDOLPH oFROANOKE: A STUDY IN CONSERVATI'E THOUGHT ch. 5
(1951); MICHAEL LANzA, AGRARIANISM AND RECONSTRUCTION POLrICS: TIM SOUrHERN
HO)mSTEAD AcT ch. 1 (1990); Oration at Worchester, July 4, 1837, in MEMOIRs,
SPEECHES AND WRTNGS OF ROBERT RANTOUL, JR 561-62, (Luther Hamilton ed., Boston,
John P. Jewitt & Co. 1854).
12 "Any economic system," wrote radical republican John Taylor, "that transfers
property from productive and natural (agricultural) to unproductive and artificial (paper)
industry is tyrannical." JOHN TAYLOR, TYRANNY UraMASKED 51 (Washington City, Davis &
Force 1822). "A mere exchange of money," he believed, "creates nothing, and does not
augment the national prosperity." John Taylor, The Necessities, Competency and Profit of
Agriculture, 2 FARMER 193, 194 (1820). Trade, to republican sentiments, was hardly more
productive than speculation. As Benjamin Franklin wrote, its profits were "generally
Cheating," compared to the true wealth produced by agriculture, "the only honest Way;
wherein Man receives a real Increase of the Seed thrown into the Ground, in a kind of
continual Miracle wrought by the Hand of God... as a reward for his innocent Life and
virtuous Industry." Benjamin Franklin, Positions to Be Examined, Apr. 4, 1769, in 16
FRANKLIN PAPERs 107, 109 (Williams Wilcox ed., 1972).
13 ROBERT E. SHALiOPE, JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE: PASTORAL REPUBiHCAN 128
(1980). As Emerson warned, the unrestrained commercial impulse would lead directly to
the "invasion of Nature by Trade with its Money, its Credit, its Steam, its Railroads... to
1994]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
To varying degrees, the political parties of Jefferson, Jackson, and William
Jennings Bryan each espoused this system of belief.
It is easily seen why this conflict should have been articulated with
unsurpassed force in deliberations over the rules affecting commercial credit, of
which bankruptcy forms a prominent part. The instrumentalities of credit14 are
all-important to a capitalist economy. 15 Indeed, Schumpeter and others have
posited "systematized credit" as the characteristic of capitalism that
distinguishes it from other economic orders. 16 Credit is the universal solvent of
the market economy, greatly increasing the liquidity of assets. 17 By detaching
the reinvestment of (anticipated) profits from the marketing of commodities
produced by earlier investment, credit speeds the cycle of capital
accumulation. 18 Acting as the nervous system of the economy, credit permits
the pooling of capital assets from diverse sources and their rapid deployment in
upset the balance of man, and establish a new, universal Monarchy more tyrannical than
Babylon or Rome." RALPH WALDO EMERSON, 5 JouNALS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 285
(Edward Waldo Emerson & Waldo Emerson Forbes eds., 1911); see also 38 ANNALS OF
CONG. 955 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Mallary); WLUAM LEGGErr, DEMOCRArTCK
EDITORIALS: ESSAYS IN JACKSONIAN PoLrrIcAL ECONOMY BY WLAM LEGGETr, PART Two
(Lawrence H. White ed., 1984); JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND
PoucY OF THE GovERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (Fredericksburg, Green &
Cady 1814).14 Credit denotes "any exchange of goods initially possessed for the promise of a
future transfer of disposal over utiles, no matter what they may be." MAX WEBER, THE
T-EORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 180 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons
trans., 1947). The time lapse between promise and performance characterizes the rights of
creditors as "property in exchange," by contrast to "property in possession."
15 FoRRm & ELLEN SHAPmO MCDONALD, REQUIEM: VARIATIONS ON EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURYTHEMES 185 (1988); ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OFNATIONS 275-77 (1937).
16 KARL MARX, 2 CAPrrAL 116 (Frederick Engels ed., 1967); JOSEPH A.
ScHuMPETER, CAPrTALISM, SOCALuSM, AND DEMOCRACY 167 (3d ed. 1950); THORSTEN
VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 133 (1935). For an excellent analysis of the
function of credit in a capitalist society, see DAviD HARVEY, THE IMrrs TO CAPrrAL ch. 9
(1982).
17 "Property of all kinds loses a portion of its value when it is deprived of its
convertible character," stated New York's Senator Tallmadge in 1840; "[c]redit alone, in
this country, renders property saleable." CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st. Sess. 798
(1840).
18 "[Credit] is a kind of mercantile funding system, which enables [merchants] to
enlarge their capital by anticipating the profits of their enterprises." 38 ANNALS OF CONG.
1098 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wood); see KOHL, supra note 6, at 195 ("By the use of the
principle of credit [commerce] has anticipated means, and produced incalculable wealth out
of resources which otherwise might have lain dormant." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Calvin
Colton)); VEBLEN, supra note 16, at 94-95.
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response to supply and demand signals, 19 eliminating geographical barriers to
investment.20 Thus credit, as much as any other factor, is responsible for the
ability of capitalism, in Marx's famous phrase, to "annihilate... space with
time." 21
While those Americans sympathetic to capitalist development routinely
supported measures to promote the extension and rationalization of the credit
network, 22 those in the republican tradition perceived in credit a mysterious
rule guided by whim and illusion, "the evil Spirit of general Vogue," 23 and the
fortunes of speculation. Credit, in their view, embodied the fickle,
unpredictable currents of change destructive to a virtuous republic.24 Thus,
credit stood paramount among the forms of transient or imaginary property that
threatened to usurp the position of the "real" property (in both senses) of the
agriculturalist.2 5
With the increase in credit utilization that accompanies commercial
development, the incidents and consequences of default expand as well.2 6
19 ROBERT HEILBRONER, THE NATURE AND LOGIc OF CAPrrALiSM ch. 3 (1985).
20 "Credit has built cities, cleared wilderness, and bound the remotest parts of the
continent together with chains of iron and gold." Edward Everett, Accumulation, Property,
Capital, and Credit, 1 HUNT'S MERCHANTS' MAG. 21, 27 (1839).
21 KARL MARX, GRUNDRISsE 539 (1973); see also DAVID HARVEY, THE
URBANIZATION OF CAPrrAL: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF CAPITAST
URBANIzATION 38 (1985). This formulation occurred to others besides Marx. Nineteenth-
century novelist Charles Brockden Brown, for example, described commerce as possessing
a "wonderful power of annihilating, in its usual and natural effects, space." STEVEN WATTS,
THE REPUBLC REBORN: WAR AND THE MAKING OF LIBERAL AMERICA, 1790-1820, at 186
(1987); see also JOHN C. CALHOUN, 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 398-406 (Richard
K. Cralle ed., New York, Appleton & Co. 1854); Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Young
American, in 1 WORKS OF EERSON 365 (1968).
22 DANL W. HowE, THE PouncAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WIGs 17 (1979);
WATSON, supra note 9, at 209. Addressing "the cause which makes us, above all others, a
happy, great, and prosperous people," a New Senator Tailmadge once asserted, "Sir, it is
contained in two words: it is our CREDIT SYSTEM." 12 CoNG. DEB. 1828-29 (1836).
23 POCOcK, supra note 10, at 454 (quoting Daniel Defoe).
24 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 483 (1840) (remarks of Rep.
Hubbard); id. at 245 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Buchanan); WILLIAM M. GOUGE, A SHORT
HISTORY OF PAPER-MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 136 (Philadelphia, T.W.
Ustik 1833).
25 JOHN TAYLOR, ARATOR; BEING A SERIES OF AGRICULTURAL ESSAYS, PRAcIcAL &
POLnTCAL 51 (Georgetown, J.M. Carter 1814). On the history of the conflict between
"property in exchange" and "property in possession," see J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE,
COMIhERCE, AND HISTORY ch. 6 (1985).
2 6 R.M. HARTWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 307
(1971).
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Hence, a modem credit system requires a systematic approach to the
administration of unpaid debts. Bankruptcy measures provide a means to
marshal and distribute an insolvent debtor's assets among his creditors while
discharging the debtor from any remaining obligations.27 This mechanism has
been described as a signal characteristic of economic modernity, "the result of
the complex development to which modem society has attained." 28
The sort of modernity discerned in bankruptcy by its proponents, however,
was precisely what rendered it so offensive to others. Republicans, too, saw
bankruptcy as part and parcel with the consolidation of the credit system,
central regulation of the economy, and the general encouragement of merchant
and finance capitalism and accordingly opposed it with passion. We are an
agricultural nation, they insisted; the institutions perpetrated by wicked
commercial cultures have no place here, and so away with them.29
On all proposed bankruptcy statutes, political and economic division
followed logically. Our first bankruptcy statute, the Act of 1800, was a
Federalist measure directed toward the needs of the commercial classes. 30
Republicans who opposed it included such luminaries as Albert Gallatin and
John Randolph, both of whom denounced the Act for its effect on the landed
interests. 31 In 1803, the party of Jefferson presided over the Act's repeal. 32
No successor statute was enacted until those portions of the Whig Party
27 Historically, these two functions distinguished bankrupt laws, per se from
"insolvent" laws. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARiES ON AMERICAN LAw 389 (John M. Gould
ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1896); J.F. Baker, The Bankrpt Law-Its Provisions and
Objects-Should the Law Be Repealed?, 6 CENT. L.J. 273 (1878). The two terms have
become roughly synonynous, however, with the tendency of modem statutes to combine
both mechanisms within a single system of administration.
28 R. McLean, Banknptcy Law, 2 LAw NoTES 292, 292 (Albert Gibson ed., 1883);
see also H.R. REP. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. (1841); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 755 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Jenckes); CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1842)
(remarks of Sen. Berrien); Adams, supra note 8, at 860-65; JOSEPH STORY, COMMNTArI
ON THE CoNsTrruTmoN OF THE UNrrED STATES §§ 1101, 1106 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, &
Co. 1833); Letter from James A. Bayard to Richard Basset (Feb 1, 1800), in PAPERs OF
JAMES A. MADISON, 1976-1815, at 95 (Eleventh Report of the Historical Manuscripts
Commission, Elizabeth Donnan ed., 1913).
2 9 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 551 (1866) (remarks of Rep.
Hastings); CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1842) (remarks of Sen. Young).
30 JoHN MARSHALL, 4 Tim PAPERs OF JOHN MARsHALL 34 (Charles T. Cullen ed.,
1984).
31 "[Mjany planters had been choused out of their property by the operations of this
very law," charged Randolph. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 379 (1803).
32 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1215 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wright); cf., CHARLES
WARREN, BANKRtuPrcY N UNrTED STATES HISTORY 19-20 (1935).
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"representing commercial sections of the country" 33 passed the short-lived Act
of 1841. 34 Drafted by Daniel Webster and Joseph Story,35 and championed by
preeminent Whig power broker Henry Clay,36 the Act came under immediate
attack from congressional Democrats, who viewed this "fine, fat, plump
offspring of Whig parentage" 37 as representative of that party's program of
centralized economic planning and rapid commercial development.3 8 That the
Act of 1841 was repealed the year after its passage was perceived as a general
repudiation of Whig policies. 39
Enacted in 1867, our third bankruptcy statute was initially intended by
postbellum Republicans, the political descendants of the Whigs, as a collection
tool to permit northern creditors to liquidate in federal court the assets of their
southern debtors, primarily land.4o Amended many times in an unsuccessful
effort to make the Act serve the need of commerce for a settled system of
insolvency relief, it was repealed in 1878 during a period of Democratic
resurgence.41
Twenty more years then passed before those who saw aggregated capital as
the engine of national progress, and an increasingly regulatory state as its
necessary ally, obtained the permanent federal bankruptcy system they had
33 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 187 (1843) (remarks of Rep. Rayner); see
also id. at 188 (remarks of Rep. Rayner); THOMAs H. BENTON, THRTY YEARS' VIEw; OR,
A HISTORY OF TEM WORKING oFTHE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT FOR THIRTY YEARS 235 (New
York, D. Appleton & Co. 1854).
34 In the interim, however, the commercial classes made numerous appeals to
Congress for bankruptcy relief, most energetically during periods of economic dislocation.
DANIEL WEBSTER, 2 THE PAPERS OF DANIELWEBSTm: SERmS TWO: LEGAL PAPERs 277-82
(Alfred S. Konefsky & Andrew J. King eds., 1983).
35 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 480 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Fillmore);
WILLIAM W. STORY, 2 LIFE AND LETTERs OF JOSEPH STORY 407 (Boston, Little & Brown
1851); A.E. Pillsbury, Suggestions on the Proposed Enactment of a Bankrupt Law, 7 S.L.
REv. 714 (1882).
36 CLEMENT EATON, HENRY CLAY AND THE ART OF AMERICAN POLmcs 151 (Oscar
Handlin ed., 1957).
37 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 49 (1842) (remarks of Rep. Payne); see
also CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1842) (remarks of Sen. Benton).
38 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 71 (1843) (remarks of Rep.
Weller); Andrew Johnson, Speech on the Admission of Oregon, Jan. 31, 1846, in 1 THE
PAPERs OFANDREW JOHNSON 282, 293 (Leroy P. Graf & Ralph W. Haskins eds., 1967).
39 "I think the most unpopular law the Congress of the United States ever passed was
the last bankrupt bill. It killed a party." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 846 (1866)
(remarks of Rep. Stevens).
4 0 WARREN, supra note 32, at 106.
41 Address of Robert E. Jenkins, of Chicago, Delivered Before the Illinois State Bar
Association, 27 Cm. LEGAL NEWS 58-60 (1894); Pillsbury, supra note 35, at 718-20.
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sought for a century. The Democrats and Populists who opposed the Act of
1898 regarded its passage as confirming the ascension of an alien presence in
our national life and signalling the destruction of their "real genuine
America" 42 of small towns and family farms.
Thus did the bankruptcy debate serve as a hobby horse on which two
opposed ideologies galloped in place for a century. As detailed below, this
controversy revealed not only the tenacity of belief systems associated with the
nation's primary economic sectors but also unexpected discrepancies of
understanding, intrinsic to those belief systems, with respect to ideals thought
common to our citizenry. Most notably these included contrasting
interpretations of the "rights" of property and contract, and the meaning of
individual liberty and community in American life.
After a description of those specific effects of bankruptcy relief that
rendered it emblematic of developmental capitalism, this Article employs the
bankruptcy debate to analyze the ideological differences associated with the
divergent and divisive economic experiences of nineteenth-century America.
The final section presents the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as the culmination of this
conflict and an expression of the maturation of American capitalism.
II. BANKRUPTCY AND THE CAPITALIST PRESENCE
A. Bankruptcy's Utility to Merchant and Finance Capital
Bankruptcy's historical popularity with the commercial classes is
attributable to its ability to promote commercial development in several ways.43
First, involuntary bankruptcy, which enables claimants against an insolvent
debtor to force liquidation of his estate, has often proved a more effective
collection tool than such alternative remedies as attachment and garnishment. 44
Indeed, the mere threat of involuntary bankruptcy may induce the payment of
42 The phrase is Whitman's. WALT WHrrMAN, 2 THE UNCOLLECTED PoETRY AND
PROSE OF WALT WmRrmAN 35 (Emory Holloway ed., 1921).
43 WijAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARmS ON TiE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 31 (1962);
McLean, supra note 28, at 292. The proponents of American bankruptcy statutes have
included commercial men of every degree of wealth and influence. A Detroit memorial
defending the Act of 1841, for example, was signed not only by a merchant and a lawyer
but also by a coppersmith, lumber merchant, printer, druggist, ship builder, ferryman,
engineer, tavern keeper, sailmaker, provisioner, inspector, laborer, merchant taylor,
mechanic, cabinet maker, constable, saddler, cartman, judge of probate, hatter, and the
captain of the steamer Erie of Detroit. Memorial of Certain Citizens of the City of Detroit
(June 19, 1841), in Records of the U.S. House of Representatives [hereinafter Rec. H.R.]
27A-G10.2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
44 CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 545 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Strange).
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debts without resort to expensive legal process. Because merchant capital is
comprised primarily of expectation interests, the enforcement of timely
repayment is of critical importance in supporting the interrelations of credit.
"Credit depends on punctuality of payment," observed one senator in 1827:
[F]or, without this punctuality, the whole value of credit, as an instrument of
commercial operation, is lost at once. To pay at the day, the merchant must
depend upon being paid at the day. One beneficial effect of a bankrupt law is
its operation as a powerful stimulus to this punctuality. 45
Both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy measures have the additional
salutary effect of preventing costly squabbles among creditors over their mutual
debtors' property by imposing a comprehensive, equitable scheme of
distribution. Under a state "grab law" regime, each creditor, fearing that he
who grabs last grabs least, will incur the costs of constantly monitoring his
debtors so as to be first on the ground when insolvency looms, 46 as well as
litigation expenses when other creditors rush to compete for the debtor's
assets. 47 This practice "is injurious to credit because it produces a feeling of
insecurity and adds to what might be called the ordinary risks of business an
arbitrary hazard." 48 Bankruptcy remedies this through the mechanism of
"preference avoidance," which defeats the advantage of creditors who were
quicker on the draw by returning their takings to the bankruptcy estate to be
distributed equally among all claimants. 49
The threat of preference avoidance, moreover, discourages creditors from
the premature liquidation of their collateral, and thus keeps debtors in gainful
45 3 CONG. DEB. 168-69 (1827) (remarks of Sen. Robbins); see also CONG. GLOBE
app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 485 (1840) (remarks of Rep. Hubbard). As Lord Mansfield
wrote: "In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty." Vallejo v.
Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (1774).
46 31 CONG. Rac. 1835 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Moody); George E. Miller, Some
Features of the Uniform Bankruptcy Law, 17 PRoc. Tax. B. Assoc. 71, 89-90 (1898).
47 Opposition to the Bankrupt Act, 7 W. JuRisT 503, 504 (1873). In the language of
economic analysis this is a "collective pool problem." A collective pool problem exists
when the economically rational behavior of claimants to joint assets conflicts with the
wealth-maximizing behavior of claimants as a group. See THOMAs H. JACKSON, TE LOGIC
AND L]m S oFBANKRuprcy LAw (1986).
48 Walter D. Coles, The Bankrupt Law of 1898-Its Merits and Defects, 7 AM. LAW.
283, 284 (1899).
49 This idea was rarely formulated in exactly this way until the present century. Noel,
supra note 4, at 188. Bankruptcy laws were always judged on their ability to enhance the
group welfare of creditors through reduced collection costs. See, e.g., Bankrupt Law, 12
AM. L. REv. 173 (1877). The present approach to preferences is codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 547 (1988).
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control of assets that have greater going concern than liquidation value,50 for
example the "good will" of a business. 51 This benefits creditors and debtors
alike. "Does the creditor's interests lie in being able to get the first grip upon
the failing debtor?" demanded one congressman in 1898; "or does his true
interest lie in stimulating healthful business and keeping [his debtors] at work
and saving them from financial ruin?" 52
Conditioning the debtor's discharge upon his full cooperation with the
liquidation of his estate may be more effective than punitive measures in
flushing out hidden assets.53 The availability of the discharge also reduces the
debtor's "perverse incentive" to incur new debts on the eve of failure in a
desperate gamble to avoid the permanent financial ruin of insolvency without
discharge. "It holds out a strong inducement to debtors to stop in season,"
stated Daniel Webster in 1840, "and to distribute their property honestly, while
they have yet property to distribute, and before they have wasted it all in
useless sacrifices to retrieve their affairs. " 54
By limiting the financial exposure of individual venturers, a discharge
regimen may encourage potentially beneficial risk-taking and the aggregation of
venture capital. In this respect, it serves the same function as permissive laws
of incorporation. 55 Finally, the discharge may return to economic activity
individuals otherwise prostrated under the load of old debts or, in less
enlightened times, confined to debtors' prison. More than charity to debtors,
this has often been said to benefit the commercial world generally by adding to
its effective supply of human capital. 56
For much of its history, bankruptcy was unable to combine effectively its
intended functions as creditors' remedy and debtors' salvation. 57 In nineteenth-
century America, the unsettled and unpredictable status of bankruptcy relief
severely limited its utility to debtors. When discharge measures were passed as
temporary palliatives to episodes of financial depression, moreover, creditors
saw their claims erased by legislative ambush and considered this a naked
50 H.R. REP. No. 65, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897).
51 31 CONG. REc. 1891 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Strode).
52 Id. at 1789 (remarks of Rep. Henderson).
53 This was the rationale for the first English discharge provision. 4 Anne ch. 17
(1705).
54 CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 815 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Webster);
see also id. at 800 (remarks of Sen. Tallmadge); 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1083-84 (1822)
(remarks of Rep. Sawyer).
55 H.R. REP. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1841); see also WLLAM E. NELSON,
THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE IN
MAsSACHusErrs SocIETY, 1760-1830, at 63 (1975).
56 See infra text accompanying notes 132-46.
57 CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 543 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Strange).
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transfer of wealth from themselves to their debtors.58 Under a stable system of
debt relief, however, it is often possible to calculate the risk of nonperformance
occasioned by bankruptcy and fairly allocate it among contracting venturers.
59
Put differently, bankruptcy becomes a mechanism of risk sharing, rather than
risk shifting, when systematically administered.
The merchant capitalist, above all others, has seen utility in the risk
management provided by bankruptcy. This perception is attributable both to his
dependence on credit and to the inherent hazards of his profession. Hunt's
Merchants' Magazine provided a brief manifesto on this point:
[Bankruptcy laws] are the natural product of commercial pursuits. The reasons
are obvious. Commercial pursuits are, generally, more hazardous than any
other branch of industry in which labor and capital can be invested. Commerce
borrows and lends; commerce is a factor; she is also a common carrier. That
which she buys and sells is subject to great and sudden fluctuations in value,
involving immense losses to buyer and seller. That which she carries is often
bome on a proverbially unstable element. While the possessions of the
agriculturalist are as stable as the "firm-set earth" which he cultivates, those of
the merchant are embarked upon the treacherous seas, with nothing but a frail,
and perhaps rotten plank, between untold treasures and the fathomless depths
below. 6o
As repeat players, moreover, commercial lenders can take an actuarial
approach to the nonperformance of individual loans. 61 Their business
experience and the volume of their transactions allow them, better than less
practiced lenders, to factor the likelihood that some ventures will fail into the
amount they charge for capital. This interest premium functions as a form of
default insurance paid by the borrower.62
Bankruptcy's effect of spreading risk more evenly among commercial
venturers has prompted Atiyah to describe it as "collectivism" in effect.63 But
this is no altruistic form of collectivism. Recognizing their vulnerability to the
whims of commercial chance, merchants have simply found it a sound bargain
to forego claims against their insolvent debtors, often of little value in any case,
for the right to obtain a like discharge in the event of their own failure. 64 In the
58 Report of the Committee on Commercial Law, 19 Cm. L. NEWS 832, 834 (1887).
59 H.R. REP. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1841).
60 A General Bankrupt Law, 4 HuNT's MERCHANTs' MAG. 22 (1841).
61 Charles Biggs, Views of the New York Credit Men's Association, BANKR. MAG.,
Nov. 1897, at55.
62 H.R. REP. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1841); see also W.G. Maxwell, The
Rights of Debtors, 39 ALB. L.J. 309, 310 (1889).
63 P.S. ATr AH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr 519 (1979).
64 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1075 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Sawyer); On a National
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case of similarly situated, long-term market participants, what is good for one
is eventually good for all.
B. The Contrasting Position of Agriculture
Unlike the merchant, the farmer has found few benefits and many
disadvantages in bankruptcy law.65 "I do not think you could find any law ever
passed or that could be passed," it was asserted in 1866, "so unpopular in an
agricultural community as a bankrupt law. "66
Bankruptcy acts to marshal and distribute a debtor's estate quickly and in a
cost effective manner. 67 Like contract law, it has the "abstracting habit," all
property reduced to exchange values when placed on the block.68 If merchants
have been willing to accept the liquidation of their (usually highly fungible)
assets as a condition of discharge, it is in the hope of then obtaining fresh credit
and returning to commercial life. But credit availability to farmers has been
more limited, and a yeoman who lost his homestead often faced a permanent
change in status to that of wage laborer.69 A mechanism that considers all
assets as abstractions does not recommend itself to those whose relationship to
particular assets cannot be severed without permanent expulsion from the
marketplace.
Therefore the farm sector has historically opposed measures that render
fixed assets more vulnerable to creditor's levy.70 Involuntary bankruptcy in
Banknpt Law, 1 AM. JuRisT 35, 44 (1829). This, of course, does not apply to those entities
that function primarily as commercial lenders. Hence, banks, wholesale houses, and other
creditor elements were often far less favorably disposed toward bankruptcy measures than
other members of the commercial community. See 31 CONG. Rc. 1839 (1898) (remarks of
Rep. Alexander); Declared to Be a Miserable Compromise, 1 NAT. BANKR. NEWS 5 (1898).
Of the congressmen who voted on passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, for example,
those who listed their occupation as "banker" voted 1 in favor and 4 against, while
"merchants" and "businessmen" voted 14 in favor and 6 against. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2743 (1866).65 WARREN, supra note 32, at 16-22; Noel, supra note 4, at 181.
66 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 846 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens).
67 Garrard Glenn, A Study in the Development of Creditor's Rights, 14 COLuM. L.
REv. 279, 280 (1914).
68 The phrase is from LAWRENCE M. FRIEMMAN, CoNTRAcr LAw IN AMERICA: A
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 20-21 (1965).
6 9 OSCAR & MARY FLUG HANDLiN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNmENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETrs, 1774-1861, at 13 (rev. ed.
1969); JOHN D. HICKs, THE POPUIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARImERs' ALIANCE
AND THE PEOPLE's PARTY 84 (1961).
70 PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDrrORs IN AMERICA 196 (1974).
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particular has earned the farmer's enmity.71 Where businessmen saw the threat
of involuntary proceedings as enforcing a beneficial punctuality, to the farmer
it subjected agriculture to a strict timetable of credit extension and repayment
antithetical to its natural rhythms. 72
Involuntary measures, further, offended the republican values of the
yeomanry by appearing to work a great abridgement of private liberties. That
the individual citizen could be made to "cringe at the foot of a Federal
judge,"' 73 "by any jack-leg lawyer in the United States," 74 simply because he
had given a preference or fallen behind in his debts, was not to be tolerated.
"The man thrown into bankruptcy," asserted a Missouri congressman in 1898,
"is compelled to attend the meeting of the creditors-their servant, their lackey,
their slave-there at their bidding, as an abject creature owned by them." 75 The
conclusion was unavoidable that "[n]o involuntary national bankrupt law can
ever be just. "76
Promises that farmers would be exempt from involuntary process never
fully allayed their fears.77 Once the forum for determining their rights was
shifted from local tribunals, "over which they have more direct control [to] the
distant, lofty courts under the Federal judges holding office for life"78 previous
representations might prove meaningless. The Supreme Court's expansive
reading of the term "trader," to which the involuntary provisions of the 1867
Act were restricted, fueled this fear considerably. 79
Another objection of the farm sector to every proposed system of
bankruptcy relief arose from the farmer's occasional status as creditor. Between
imparting his crops or livestock to a factor or other middleman and the receipt
of the sale proceeds, the farmer's interest in the product of his labor is merely
an unsecured claim against that middleman. Should that person fail, and be
71 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 554 (1803) (remarks of Rep. Smith); THOMAs JEFMRSON,
Thoughts on the Bankruptcy Bill (Dec. 10, 1792), in 24 TiE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFEMSON
722 (John Calanzariti ed., 1990); Charles R Morgan, The Legal Origins of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1800 39-40 (1973) (unpublished M. Arts thesis, University of Virginia).
72 G.P. Bauer, Imprisonment for Debt 79-80 (1935) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University); N.W. Bliss, The Torrey Bill-Redivivus (Feb. 9, 1892), in Records of
the U.S. Senate, [hereinafter Rec. Sen.] SEN 52A-J14.1, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.
73 31 CONG. REC. 1803 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Henry).
74 Id. at 1796 (remarks of Rep. Bell); see also id. at 1793-95 (remarks of Rep.
Underwood).
75 Id. at 6430 (remarks of Rep. De Armond).
76 Id. at 1802 (remarks of Rep. Henry).
77 See id. at 1862 (remarks of Rep. Linney).
78 Id. at 6430 (remarks of Rep. De Armond).
7 9 Toofv. Martin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 40 (1871).
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discharged from his debts under a bankruptcy statute, the farmer will share pro
rata in the bankruptcy estate with other unsecured creditors, but have no further
remedy.80 The farmer has usually been in no position to calculate this risk or to
adjust the price of his product accordingly. "What is this," demanded one
antebellum Virginian, "but to make the farmer the perpetual insurer against
every wind that blows . . . without the possibility of a premium for
insurance?" 81 What little return might be procured from the bankruptcy of a
destitute middleman, moreover, often depended upon journeying to a distant
federal court and negotiating the intricacies of its procedures. "Farmers would
be slow in tackling up their wagons on such a journey, and would rather risk
the loss of their debt, of which they would not be very sanguine .... "82
The conclusion that bankruptcy laws were solely for the benefit of the
merchant class was commonly drawn.83 When, for example, Federalist James
Bayard lauded the Act of 1800 for eliminating such parochial restraints on
commerce as the "feudal policy" of exempting real estate from creditor's
levy, 84 a Republican delegate chided in response: "[i]f the gentleman were as
well acquainted with the landed interest as with that of professional men and
merchants, I believe we should have been spared the necessity of listening to
much of the learned gentleman's speech." 85
III. COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY AND CONTRACT
A. Contract Under Natural Law
In addition to conflicts of material interest, the bankruptcy debate
revealed-and was sustained by-a divergence of understanding between the
commercial and agricultural sectors respecting certain principals often thought
to constitute ideological common ground to American citizens. First among
these was the nature of property, specifically those property rights "in
exchange" embodied in contracts.
Farmers have historically regarded property as something tangible to be
physically held and used-primarily land and its products-its value deriving
80 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1029 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Phillips); 12 ANNALS OF CONG.
550 (1803) (remarks of Rep. Bacon).
81 38 ANNALS oF CoNG. 1067-68 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Barbour).
82 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 330 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Pope).
83 See, e.g., 38 ANNALS OF CoNG. 1061 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Barbour); 12
ANNALS OF CoNG. 550 (1803) (remarks of Rep. Bacon); id. at 560 (remarks of Rep.
Newton).
84 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 549 (1803) (remarks of Rep. Bayard).
85 Id. at 551 (remarks of Rep. Bacon).
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from its utility in possession. Naturally, some portion of the farmer's product
will be taken to market and become temporarily property in exchange. But this
process was seen as little different than straightforward barter between
producers, closely circumscribed in time. Not present was the idea that an
ongoing process of exchange would, of itself, generate social wealth.
To the commercial classes, on the other hand, tangible assets exist for the
very purpose of exchange. They have long recognized that the process of
transfer creates new forms of property, mostly debt instruments, that
themselves represent real wealth and stimulate economic production in an
ongoing cycle.86 They consider property in exchange to be not only a
legitimate form of property, but under some circumstances the most productive
form. As the predecessor of the Dun & Bradstreet agency opined in 1876, the
economic utility of property is so dependent upon its liquidity that "the hopes
of a sound business superstructure must rest on the basis of... less fixed and
more floating capital[.] ' 87
To the farmer, contract rights spring directly from the tangible property
created with the sweat of his brow.8 8 Hence, they carry the same claim to
absolute legal protection as other Lockean property entitlements. This principle
was often said to stand above positive law. Denouncing a proposed bankruptcy
statute in 1822, one congressman asserted:
Can Congress say that, from and after the passage of a law, a horse belonging
to A shall belong to B? Such an act would be a violation of those social and
fundamental principles on which the Government is based, and by which it is
held together. Such an act would be not only beyond the power of a
Legislature, but even a Constitution .... The obligations of justice and right
are paramount to all others. Even the people, in their primary and collective
capacity, have no power to divest individuals of their rights or property. A
debt is property, and subject to the same rules .... 89
It followed that whenever the state obviates contract debts it directly abets a
"flagrant violation of the right of property." 90
Because their contracts derive from face-to-face bargains, and address
matters largely under their personal control, agriculturalists have tended toward
86 See J.H. Balfour Browne, Contract, 2 AM. LEGAL REc. 11, 12 (1873).
87 The Failures for the Year 1875, ANN. CIRCuLAR (Office of the Mercantile Agency),
January 15, 1876 at 2, in Rec. H.R. H55-F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
88 See C. VANN WOODWARD, TOM WATSON: AGRARIAN REBEL 247 (1938).
89 38 ANNALS oFCoNG. 799-800 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Smyth).
90 Petition to repeal Bankrupt Law [from citizens of Montgomery County, Tenn.]
(1842), and Memorial from Certain Citizens of Henry and Shelby Counties, Ky. (1843), in
Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
19941
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a libertarian, "natural law" view of contract as an absolute moral obligation of
the individual. "It would be admitted," opined a Virginia congressman, "as a
principle of universal law, (and as universally just), that all contracts are
obligatory, and must continue to have force, until performed." 9' Thus
agrarians did not accept any division between private morality and public
policy that would permit the state to act in an instrumentalist fashion in
enforcing certain contracts and not others. 92
B. The Utilitarian View of Contract
The commercial classes have never disputed that contracts are closely
connected to the rights of property and deserve, as a general matter, state
protection. 93 Indeed, nothing is more fundamental to the functioning of a
market economy. They have been less likely, however, to proceed to absolutist
conclusions about the inviolability of contract. The capitalist sector has
adopted, instead, a more utilitarian approach toward contract, which denies that
the state either could or should enforce private promises in a manner
uninformed by other social concerns. This attitude derived directly from the
merchant experience.
Libertarian contract doctrine, which insists that contracts are created and
fully defined by the free will of the parties, must always have appeared
somewhat naive to men of commerce. Given the multitude of risks attending
merchant ventures, performance is never completely a matter of the will of the
parties, but to some degree must remain subject to events beyond the power of
human foresight to predict or control.94 The merchant cannot deliver promised
goods if his ship (literally) fails to come in. And as commerce evolves in
complexity, the ability of individual merchants to perform their contracts
becomes increasingly dependent on the actions of others in expanding chains of
financial and legal responsibility. 95
91 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 774 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Stevenson).
92 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 492 (1841) (remarks of Rep.
Underwood).
93 See, e.g., Memorial of the Louisville Chamber of Commerce (Jan. 5, 1842), in
Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
94 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1212 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Hill); see also CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2742 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Jenckes); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract
and Justice: The Relations Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70
IOWAL. Ray. 769, 786 (1985).
95 When banks or other issuers of commercial paper fail, for example, so will those
merchants who dealt in reliance upon their paper. Thomas Hart Benton complained that the
oligarchy of banks "violate[s] all their own promises, and compel[s] others to violate
theirs." CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 506 (1840).
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In addition, a merchant's failure to honor his promises may result directly
from "acts of the Government,... over which the merchant had no
control."'96 "There is another class of insolvents," declared Georgia's Senator
Berrien, "whom misfortune... in many instances the action of this and other
Governments on their commercial operations, not their own wild spirit of
adventure, has reduced to penury." 97 The embargo of Jefferson's presidency
brought ruin upon scores of traders. Sixty years later, others became insolvent
when the Civil War transformed, in legal status, millions of dollars in merchant
collateral into American citizens. 98 As one member of Congress reflected in
1898, such vicissitudes of history are not for the individual to predict:
There are some men who think that a man can not be a debtor and be honest,
and that he must at least have been imprudent. But at the outbreak of the
[Civil] war whole classes of merchants were ruined by the loss of their
Southern collections. In 1873 whole communities went down because of the
false valuations placed, not by the man, but by the community, upon lands and
upon railroads. 99
Such observations present the state as both the rulemaker and an active
participant in economic life, not the impartial referee posited by liberal theory.
The implications of this are far-reaching. The effects of governmental
intervention are not only substantial, 100 but also inherently discriminatory, for
the burdens and benefits of any state action will inevitably fall unevenly. From
its basic premises, however, the liberal state is proscribed from favoring the
welfare of certain of its citizens over others.101 Thus, as the commercial classes
96 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1212 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Hill); see also EDwARD CHASE
KRLAND, DREAM AND THOUGHT IN Tim BusnmsS COMMUNrrY, 1860-1900, at 115
(1956); Memorial of Various Citizens of the State of Kentucky Against the Repeal of the
Bankrupt Law (Jan. 7, 1843), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.; Remonstrance of Cope, Todhunter & Co. and 24 Other Persons from Philadelphia
Against Repeal of the Bankrupt Law (Dec. 27, 1842), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3., National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
97 3 CONG. DEB. 200 (1827) (remarks of Sen. Berrien).
98 Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1861), in COMPLETE
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LNcOLN 99 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1920).
99 31 CONG. REc. 1852 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Parker).
100 With respect to the rulemaking function of the state, Weber and others have denied
that government can function in a wholly "transparent" way, doing no more than
implementing the agreements of private parties without influencing their content. WEBER,
supra note 14, at 173; EMILE DUREaM, THE DivisioN OF LABOUR IN SOCETY 153 (W.D.
Halls trans., 1984).
101 Ralph Lerner, Commerce and Character: The Anglo-American as New-Model Man,
36 WM. & MARY Q., 3d Ser. 3, 9 (1979).
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were first to comprehend, it is forced into a utilitarian mode of decisionmaking
and must proceed by quantifying the greatest good for the greatest number.' 02
"What is public justice?" by this view; answered one congressman, it is "[a]
sort of conventional virtue, whose binding force is founded on principles of
utility."10 3
From a utilitarian standpoint, all forms of property, contract included,
appear less a Lockean entitlement to the product of one's labor than an
incentive to socially productive activity.104 Bankruptcy exemplifies the move to
regulate "in such manner as to render the use of property subservient to the
public welfare.' 0 5 Based upon concerns of economic efficiency, national
bankruptcy administration promised to smooth the course of development, and
thereby increase social wealth, by removing the impediments of an overly
personalized and subjective system of debt collection.10 6
But in concluding with Daniel Webster that "[t]he proper law-making
power may act upon this relation [of contract], and alter and modify it, upon
principles of general policy, justice, and utility, whenever it sees fit,"1 07 few
proponents of bankruptcy measures went so far as to dispute the contractarian
102 Indeed, this was the role of the state envisioned by Hobbes, who implicitly adopted
a rule-utilitarian code. JOSEPH RAz, THE MoRAr-rY oF FREEDOM 7 (1986); I. SHAPIRO,
EVOLUnON OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 76 (1986).
103 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1232 (1833) (remarks of Rep. Cushman).
104 See Daniel Webster, Discourse Delivered at Plymouth, in Commemoration of the
First Settlement of New England (Dec. 22, 1820), in 1 SPEECHES AND FORENsIc
ARGUMENTS 48-49 (Boston, Tappan & Dennet, 8th ed. 1843); William H. Taft, The Right
of Private Property, 3 MIcH. L.J. 215, 224 (1894) ("The very advantage to be derived from
the security of private property in our civilization is that it turns the natural selfishness and
desire for gain into the strongest motive for doing that without which the upward
development of mankind would cease and retrogression would begin.").
Compare KOHL, supra note 6, at 51 with DAVID HUME, Enquiries Concerning the
Principles of Morals, in ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING & CONCERNING
THE PRINCipLES oF MORALS 241-42 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 3d ed. 1975).
105 38 ANNALS oFCONG. 1096 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wood).
106 See, e.g., The Bankrupt Law-The Mischief and the Remedy, DEraorr Tam., Feb.
25, 1876, at 1; Memorial of Certain Citizens of the State of Kentucky Against the Repeal of
the Bankrupt Law (Jan. 7, 1842), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.; Memorial of the Merchants and Traders of the Town of Boston to the Congress of
the United States 2 (Dec. 27, 1819), in Rec. Sen. SEN 16A-G7, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.; Petition of Manufacturing Jewelers' Board of Trade Providence, R.I.
(Jan. 16, 1885), in Rec. H.R. 48.A-H12.8, National Archives, Washington, D.C.;
Remonstrance of Cope, Todhunter & Co. and 24 Other Persons from Philadelphia Against
Repeal of the Bankrupt Law (Dec. 27, 1847), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G10.3, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
107 CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 814 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Webster).
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foundations of American political ideology. Rather, they worked within its
basic precepts to fashion a role for the state that was more flexible than that
dictated by strict liberal theory.
Fortunately, requiring that state authority be premised upon the consent of
the citizenry leaves much room for interpretation. For example, consent may be
found implicit in conduct. In the context of promoting federal bankruptcy
measures, it was sometimes argued that acceptance of the risk of default upon
insolvency is at least an implicit term in all merchant dealings. 10 8 In this way,
bankruptcy statutes, rather than defeating the intentions of the parties, were
said to formalize the understanding of commercial venturers that their
undertakings are predicated upon the uncertain hope of ability to perform when
performance is due.
Following a similar logic, it was occasionally maintained that, once a
bankruptcy statute is on the books, contracting parties tacitly incorporate its
potential operation into their agreements. 10 9 Hence, any subsequent repeal of
the statute will alter the terms of private contract. This theory was expounded
in an exchange between Republican John Randolph and Federalist James
Bayard over repeal of the Act of 1800. Randolph asserted that the Act was no
different than an ex post facto law, in his view an offense against natural law,
in that both alter the rights of individuals in a post hoc fashion.110 Bayard, the
Act's most vigorous proponent, proceeded to turn that argument on its head:
The argument of the gentleman from Virginia [Rep. Randolph] that the
bankrupt law was expostfacto, would not apply [he said]; but an act to repeal
would in reality be an e post facto law. Many merchants had entered into
contracts, having an eye to the bankrupt law; many had embarked in perilous
enterprises, knowing, that if they had made unfortunate calculations, that by a
surrender of their effects they might again engage in commercial pursuits."'I
Although this theory addresses prospective debt relief measures, statutes
having retrospective application could be similarly validated by positing that the
state was granted ongoing authority to modify contractual duties in the social
compact. As Justice Trimble wrote in 1827: " [W]hen men form a social
compact, and organize a civil government, they necessarily surrender the
regulation and control of these natural rights and obligations into the hands of
108 See, e.g., Maxwell, supra note 62, at 310.
109 See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); CONG. GLOBE,
27th Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Roosevelt); see also CHARLES WARREN,
1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 689 (1926).
110 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 377 (1803) (remarks of Rep. Randolph).
'11 Id. at 378 (remarks of Rep. Bayard).
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the government."11 2 From the presence of the Bankruptcy Clause in our
Constitution, it was easy to conclude that an absolute right to repayment on a
debt was one of those natural law entitlements given up by Americans in
forming our national union.1 13 This, too, was said to provide an implicit
background term to all private contracts. "The possibility of dissolution on the
contingency [of the passage of a bankruptcy statute] would be incident to every
contract," remarked one antebellum congressman, "an original ingredient
inherent in it, and as inseparable from it as from a material object."1 14 In 1841,
Hunt's Merchants'Magazine connected explicitly the positivist view of contract
with basic utilitarian principles of government:
The principle upon which political society enforces pecuniary obligations is
this: individuals have surrendered the right to enforce these obligations for
themselves, upon the implied undertaking of society to enforce them. Hence
the political duty to enforce these obligations is imperative, and limited only by
considerations relating to the general good. It will be seen that the duty is not
unqualified. One broad exception to the general rule is, that society does not
enforce mere moral obligations to pay money, although the individuals might
have enforced such obligations in a state of nature. There are numerous other
exceptions: for example, the contracts of married women, and minors, and
contracts not evidenced by writing, and contracts expiring under the statutes of
limitation, are not enforced, although the natural and moral obligations of
those contracts may be perfect. Society does not, therefore, strictly enforce all
the natural rights of individuals. Why not? Because it governs itself by
considerations of expediency; because the good of the few must yield to the
good of the many.115
Even absent express authority under social compact to obviate the rights of
contract, it is an essential prerogative of government to alter, from time to
time, the remedies available to contract creditors. The laws of garnishment and
attachment, for example, cannot be expected to remain static in perpetuity.
"The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy ... exists
in the nature of things," opined Justice Marshall in 1819; "[w]ithout impairing
the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the
112 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 319 (Trimble, J., concurring). This is the
Hobbesian view of social compact, emphasizing the giving up of natural law rights in
exchange for the benefits of organized society. THOMAS HOBBES, LEIATHAN ch. 28 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1968).
113 See, e.g., 31 CONG. REc. 1796 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Lanham); 38 ANALS OF
CONG. 1086-87 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Sawyer).
114 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1095 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wood).115 A General Bankupt Law, supra note 60, at 31-32 (emphasis added).
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wisdom of the nation shall direct." 116
In the bankruptcy debate, the distinction between right and remedy was
extended to defend discharge measures that effectively denied creditors any
practical recourse whatsoever. Bankruptcy proponents argued that such
measures operate only upon legal remedies, "[a]nd though a man might be
discharged from his contracts, the sense of moral obligation was not impaired-
inforo conscientoe he was still answerable." 117 To those who found only cold
comfort in putative "rights" they could not enforce at law, 118 it was said that
no system could fully enforce the normative dimensions of contract. To attempt
to do so would be futile in some instances and would lead to the waste of
public and private resources in others. There being no absolute right to
repayment of debts, the proponents of commercial modernity easily concluded
that the state was entitled to pass such bankruptcy measures as were necessary
to "accommodate the progressive advancement of the age, the extension of
trade and commerce, and the expansion of the credit system." 119
IV. DEBT RELIEF AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM
A. Land and the Republican Ideal of Political Freedom
Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans of all walks of life believed
that legal protection for economic initiative was a requirement both of
individual right and social welfare. 120 All was not harmony, however. As
revealed in disputes over creditor remedies, including those provided under
116 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819); see also Bronson
v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 315 (1843). The distinction between right and remedy has
been made frequently by our courts in approving legislative abridgements of the remedies
previously enjoyed by creditors. William Sternberg, Three Theories of Relief Legislation, 24
GEo. L.J. 82, 94-95 (1935).
117 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 725 (1803) (remarks of Rep. Bayard); see also 3 CONG.
DEB. 161 (1827) (remarks of Sen. Rowan); 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 762 (1822) (remarks of
Rep. Sergeant); McLean, supra note 28, at 293. The same distinction underlies the doctrine
that an agreement to forgive a moral debt, the legal correlative to which is already
discharged in bankruptcy, constitutes consideration for a new contractual benefit. See
Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957).
118 See, e.g., 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1037 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Archer) ("What was
the inviolability of contract, separate from the inviolability of remedy .... ).
119 CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 461 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Wall); see
also 3 CONG. DEB. 161 (1827) (remarks of Sen. Rowan).
120 See generally JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDrTONs OF FREEDOM IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNrTED STATES (1956); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMER ANIzAnON OF THE COMMON LAW (1975).
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bankruptcy statutes, the primary sectors of American life separated dramatically
over what constitutes truly productive activity, and the nature of the legal
protection it deserves.
To the farm sector, economic production meant the application of physical
labor to land and other hard assets. When macroeconomic forces interfered
with their ability to service their debts, fanners believed it appropriate to
restrict creditor remedies as necessary to protect the economic contribution of
the country's most productive citizens, themselves. 121 Most politically charged
among measures to that end were moratoria (or "stay") laws, which halt the
legal collection machinery at some point prior to levy. 122 Despite the
determination of the Founders, expressed in the Contract Clause, that stay laws
should be abandoned as destructive to our national credit system, the states
never overcame the temptation to assist their debtors during hard times through
such temporary restrictions on creditor remedies. 123
Stay laws appealed to the conservative ideology of agrarian republicans as
much as to their material interests. As one scholar observes, moratoria are
conservative forms of legislation, intended "to preserve the old order through a
period of crisis." 124 Bankruptcy laws, by contrast, "clear away the debris of a
previous era of overexpansion and over indebtedness: a policy based on the
assumption that former times cannot be recreated. 1 125
121 DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAY'S REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN
INsURREcTnON (1980).
122 See generally COLEMAN, supra note 70, at 35; JACKSON T. MAIN, PoLrnCAL
PART=S BEFORE THE CONSrrrunON 333-35 (1974); A.H. Feller, Moratoria Legislation: A
Comparative Study, 46 HARv. L. REV. 1061, 1067 (1933).
123 While some of these statutes were blatantly offensive to the Contract Clause, others
attempted to artfully skirt its reach by preserving the putative rights of creditors while, in
fact, making their enforcement impossible. Under an 1861 South Carolina statute, for
example, creditors were permitted to take their claims to judgment, but any marshal or any
other officer of the court who executed that judgment committed a criminal act. William
Sternberg, Three Theories of Relief Legislation, 24 GEO. L.J. 82 (1935); Robert H. Skilton,
Government and the Mortgage Debtor, 1929-1939, at 62 (1944) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania); see also Comment, The Blaisdell Decision-One
Year After, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 74 (1935); Comment, Recent Legislation for the Relief
of Mortgage Debtors, 42 YALE L.J. 1236, 1240 (1933). The Supreme Court was historically
hostile to retroactive moratoria legislation and other measures impairing a creditor's right to
a quick and effective remedy. See Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 314 (1872);
McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1
How.) 311 (1843). In the 1930s, however, the Court declared permissible moratoria that
included reasonable protections for creditors' interests. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
124 Skilton, supra note 123, at 51.
125 Id.
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At least on a temporary basis, moreover, stay laws appeared to agrarians to
take time out of the control of the monied interests, which subjected it to the
rhythm of capitalist accumulation, and return it to the owners of the land.
Because they purport to do no more than defend the status quo, pending return
of the conditions under which debts were incurred and ought reasonably to be
enforced, stay laws could be said to work no serious violation of the "sacred"
rights of contract. Finally, by reducing state intervention into private life, they
comported well with the laissez-faire bias of many agrarians.
A second form of legislation protective of property in possession, and
therefore traditionally attractive to farmers, is the exemption law. Such
measures shield certain categories of property, up to specified values, from
attachment for debt. Early exemption statutes protected only a few tools and
household goods from creditor's levy. By the 1870s, however, they had
become quite extensive catalogs of socially significant property interests. 126
Beds, bibles and family portraits were often included, as were guns and
military equipage. In all parts of the country, the most frequently exempted
implements of economic life, however, were those necessary for family
farming, such as a specificed number of oxen, horses or mules, and certain
basic items of farm machinery. 127 The most financially significant exemption
was usually that provided for land as a family homestead. 128
Moratoria laws and homestead and other exemptions protected from the
machinery of the market economy those relationships between Americans and
their property considered most essential to our national well-being. Deeply
republican forms of legislation, they reflected a belief that national prosperity
and virtue were best served when the populace was engaged in the production
of tangible wealth from the land. The conflict between these forms of
legislation and federal administration of insolvency, which would permit State
law protections of property to be "construed, and allowed or disallowed, by
these Federal judges far removed from the people," was readily apparent and
fueled opposition to all proposed bankruptcy acts.129
12 6 WARREN, supra note 32, at 110.
127 State Exemption Laws, 1 GAZmTE AND BANKRUPT Cr. REP., Aug. 1, 1867, at 9-
10.
128 Many statutes discriminated between town and rural homesteads in a way that
favored the latter. 31 CoNG. REc. 1910 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Lloyd); State Exemption
Laws, supra note 127, at 9, 11.
129 See 31 CONG. REC. 6431 (1898) (remarks of Rep. McRae).
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B. The Freedom to "Truck, Barter, and Exchange"
Men of commerce believed as fully as did agrarians that a love of
unrestrained economic activity is fundamental to the American character. "[N]o
one will deny, that the greatest possible exemption from personal restraint
bears the closest analogy to the common sentiments and habits of Americans,"
stated a group of Boston merchants in 1819, "and is highly congenial to that
pure and equal spirit of liberty which animates our whole civil and political
character." 130 They also agreed that this propensity, when given its head,
redounds to the public good. Unlike agrarians, however, they did not equate
beneficial economic activity solely with the application of individual labor to
tangible assets. As mentioned, they saw transactions of exchange, even
transfers of "paper" wealth, as contributing to the liquidity and allocative
efficiency of our capital stock and, hence, to its productive capability.
It followed that the minions of commerce were to be cherished for their
restless, striving energies, so beneficially directed. 131 "The world is a vast
storehouse of energy," opined one writer in 1889: "The whole genius of man
is constantly operating upon Nature to wrest from her as much as possible, and
in this warfare no helpful agency should be extinguished nor any individual
crippled. Every businessman is an agent in the great work."1 32 Others went so
far as to that assert that "most of the great enterprises and improvements of our
country are mainly due to [the merchant's] energy and spirit of enterprise." 133
Hence the need for federal administration of insolvency. By eliminating a
patchwork of state regulations, it would knock down provincial barriers to
commerce and "give the largest value to individual liberty and to individual
activity, in order to make the whole of this vast country the theater of every
citizen's activity and enterprise and energy." 134
Bankruptcy law would also promote individual liberty and productivity
through its discharge mechanism. By exempting future profits from the claims
of their creditors, those "harpies who consume the very beginnings of
accumulation," bankruptcy would free insolvent merchants from the bondage
130 Memorial of the Merchants and Traders of the Town of Boston to the Congress of
the United States (Dec. 27, 1819), in Rec. Sen. SEN 16A-G.7, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
131 See 31 CONG. REC. 1798 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Lanham).
132 Maxwell, supra note 62, at 310.
133 Memorial of J. Nelson Guekey and Other Citizens of New York, Praying for the
Passage of a Bankruptcy Law (Mar. 1862), in Rec. H.R. 37A-G21.2, National Archives
Washington, D.C.
134 16 CONG. REc. 460 (1885) (remarks of Rep. Potter); see also CONG. GLOBE app.,
27th Cong., 1st Sess. 471 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Fessenden).
[Vol. 55:291
MATURING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM
of debt to return to commercial activity. 135 Explained one Whig congressman:
It is by employing capital . . . that profits are made beyond what are
indispensable for personal support. And all this is forbidden to the debtor;
since, so long as he is unprotected by a discharge, some one creditor or
another, armed with the power of the courts, stands ready to seize every
solitary surplus dollar which he may chance to find in the debtor's
possession. 136
Always it was emphasized that any measure effecting the resurrection of
"financially dead" businessmen would benefit not only those individuals but,
by replacing their shoulders to the great economic wheel, the public as well. 137
The object of bankruptcy, stated the American Jurist, "is to unfetter and
promote the industry and enterprise of our population. " 138 "It is not [debtors]
only who are interested in the matter," advised one legislator in 1840, "the
country has an interest in their activity, and industry, and talents, that they may
be again set free to add to its general wealth and prosperity." 139 Stated a
Massachusetts senator of the Act of 1841: "[I]t will quicken every spindle, and
put money in the pocket of every shoe manufacturer and hat manufacturer
among [our] people." 140
Together with the energies of commercial debtors, their property too
would remain productively employed under a bankruptcy regimen, because
debtors would have less incentive (and opportunity) to hide assets from
creditors. "If property must be concealed from the view of the world, and can
be used only in secret, it loses almost entirely its value," 14 1 both to its owner
135 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Nisbet); id.
at 498 (remarks of Rep. Barnard). Similarly, see Miller, supra note 46, at 77.
136 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 498 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Barnard).
137 See, among hundreds of other possible examples, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2742 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Jenckes); CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 99
(1842) (remarks of Sen. Clay); CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1840)
(remarks of Sen. Wall); Id. at 836 (remarks of Sen. Smith); 3 CONG. DEB. 171 (1827)
(remarks of Sen. Robbins); Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Minnesota for a
General Bankrupt Act (Feb. 7, 1863), in Rec. H.R. 37A-G21.2, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.; Memorial of the Merchants and Traders of the Town of Boston to the
Congress of the United States (Dec. 27, 1819), in Rec. Sen. SEN 16A-G7, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.; Opposition to Repeal or Postponement of the Bankrupt Law
[from Certain Citizens of New York] (Feb. 14, 1842), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3., National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
138 On a National Banknpt Law, 1 AM. JuRIsT 35, 49 (1829).
139 CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Clayton).
140 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1842) (remarks of Sen. Choate).
141 Miller, supra note 46, at 89.
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and to a nation poor in capital goods. This was often a problem with respect to
provincial debtors, who were well positioned to conceal assets from distant
lenders. A northern congressman complained in 1841 that the assets of
southern debtors were commonly "put into a napkin and buried up in the
earth... [and thus] lost to business, lost to commerce, lost to trade, lost to
manufactures, and to all useful purpose." 142 A national bankruptcy statute, he
believed, "would disinter those assets from their burial place."'143
The "financial death" concept was closely linked to appeals to view
commercial failure not as the mark of dishonesty or incompetence, meriting
punishment, but instead a matter of personal misfortune, 144 or even proof of an
adventurous spirit worthy of encouragement. 145 Commerce advances through
trial and error, insisted its spokesmen, and "Americans, who have turned rash
speculation into a sort of virtue, can in no case stigmatize those who are thus
rash.' 146 As Hunt's Merchants" Magazine explained:
The American people are proverbially enterprising; and a facility for obtaining
credit, co-operating with a temperament active and sanguine, constantly tempts
to enterprises of peculiar hazard, and oft-times singularly disastrous in their
results. These losses fall heavily on individuals; but the ardent and enterprising
spirit which encounters great labors and hazards for the sake of probable,
sometimes only possible success, is no doubt the source of our unparalleled
growth and prosperity. 147
To the commercial groups, the salvation through bankruptcy of "citizens
lost to themselves, lost to their country,"' 148 was a truly progressive prospect.
They saw it in much the same light as the elimination of imprisonment for
debt. 149 Orated one member of Congress in 1841:
142 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1841) (remarks of Sen.
Choate).
143 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 480 (1841) (remarks of Sen. Choate).
144 Id.; Public Meeting at Syracuse in Favor of the Passage of a General Bankrupt
Law (June 24, 1841), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
145 See, e.g., 31 CONG. REc. 1909 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Lewis); 12 ANNALS OF
CONG. 551 (1803) (remarks of Rep. Eustis); 3 CONG. Da. 170 (1827) (remarks of Sen.
Robbins); Hon. George W. Ray, Add to the Dignity and Wealth of Our County, BANKR.
MAG., Apr. 1898, at44.14 6 ALExiS DE TOCQUEVILE, DEmOCRACYIN AMERIcA 622 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
14 7 A General Bankrupt Law, supra note 60, at 23; see also Charles Edwards, What
Constitutes a Merchant?, 1 HuNT's MERCHANTS' MAG. 289 (1839).
148 3 CONG. DEB. 170 (1827) (remarks of Sen. Robbins).
149 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2742 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Jenckes);
CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 480 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Brown); 38 ANNALS
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The obligations of the debtor does [sic] not include the forfeiture of all the
rights which belong to humanity. Honest misfortune has its penalties, which
are grievous enough; but it is no part of such penalty to doom the debtor to the
most odious slavery that the human imagination can conceive-a slavery a
thousand times more deplorable than that of the Helotes of old, the villeins of
feudality, or the serfs of modem despotism, the perpetual slavery of debt,
which enervates and subdues the mind, at the same time that it condemns the
body to a perpetual thraldom, which can look to no emancipation but the last
refuge of suffering humanity-the grave. 150
The "slavery" of hopeless indebtedness and the "feudal" relations between
debtor and creditor it created were frequently adverted to as the hallmarks of an
older, oppressive social order, properly cast out by a free people. 151
Bankruptcy measures thus became symbolic of the democratic and egalitarian
component of American capitalist thought, directly supporting the link between
individual economic freedom and social welfare.
V. TWO VISIONS OF COMMUNITY
A. The One Genuine America
Both the agricultural and commercial sectors viewed their activities as
fundamental to a community of interests presently existing and national in
scope. Yet their conceptions of community, as articulated in the bankruptcy
debate, bore little resemblance to each other. To those in the republican
tradition, community was comprised of a population of independent freeholders
with a stable relationship to the land and their neighbors, united in a common
experience of family fanning and a roughly equivalent material status. This
egalitarian, conservative and essentially localistic conception of community told
forcefully against bankruptcy legislation.
By letting off too easily those sharp characters whose schemes resulted in
the failure they so richly deserved, bankruptcy threatened to: "stimulate the
spirit of speculation almost to madness." 152 This would bring about great
OF CONG. 1210 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Hill).
150 CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 462 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Wall); see
also STORY, supra note 28, § 1106.
151 See 31 CONG. REc. 1893 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Connoly); CONG. GLOBE app.,
26th Cong., 1st Sess. 543 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Strange); id. at 818 (remarks of Sen.
Clay); 38 ANNALS OFCoNG. 1115 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Woodson); Maxwell, supra note
62, at 309.
152 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1841) (remarks of Sen. Buchanan);
see also CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Benton); 38
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disparities in wealth, undermining the stability of local society and inevitably
promoting in influence those elements identified not with traditional values but
the hollow promise and the unearned dollar.153 Stated certain New Hampshire
memorialists of the Act of 1841: "[it would] encourage wild and numerous
speculations . . . assumes to violate solemn contracts, and deprive the
industrious and prudent portion of our citizens, of a legal right to the earnings
of their industry, to benefit a class of people, composed to a great extent of the
idle and extravagant.' 54
Bypassing the concerns of the "one genuine America" of small towns and
family farms to serve the monied interests, bankruptcy appeared an odious
form of "class legislation [which] should be abhorred as a demon seeking the
destruction of our Republic." 155 Echoing Jefferson's dictum that merchants
"have no country,"' 156 a South Carolina congressman derided as follows the
idea of favoring that group to which we, as a nation, owe the least:
If a distinction is made [on the subject of debt relief], ought it not to be made
in favor of the agricultural class? Who constitute the country? Who give
Government its strength and its fastenings? Who feed the public Treasury?
Who fill and command our armies of defense; lend wings to our navy, and
supply commerce with its aliments. [And not the] merchant, a man of every
country and of no country; who is perfectly indifferent whether the sun rises on
him to the north or the south of the equator, whose attachments and hopes are
regulated by the price currents which he daily receives, or who estimates the
worth of every man, not by his virtue but by the balance in his ledger. I speak
of them as a class. Are they the persons on whom we are to rely and whom we
are to privilege?157
Such statements emphasized the alien quality that republicans discerned in
the capitalist classes. Accepting a corrupt calculus of individual gain as an
adequate basis for private conduct, members of no conimunity except the camp-
followers of the Almighty Dollar, capitalists were a variety of men "who have
ANNALs OF CONG. 960 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Mallary).
153 31 CONG. REC. 1803 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Henry); Commentary, 3 LAw Noras
202 (1900).
154 New Hampshire: Petition from 412 Citizens of Coos County for the Repeal of the
Bankrupt Bill (Dec. 30, 1841), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G10.3, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.
155 31 CONG. REC. 1802 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Hay).
15 6 Jefferson's observation drew, in tram, from ADAM SMrm, THE NATURE AND
CAusEs OF THE WEALTH OF NAnONs 395 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937). See Andrew Jackson,
Veto Message, in 4 A CowmPnrIoN oF THE MESSAGEs AND PAPERs oF THE PREDENS
1467 (Richardson ed., New York, Bureau of National Literature 1896).
157 38 ANNALs oF CONG. 1023 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell) (emphasis added).
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preyed upon and destroyed all previous civilizations... whose moral sense is
destroyed by the business in which they are engaged."1 58 Having slipped the
moorings of social tradition, they appeared to be outside the pale of American
community.
Because the interests of merchant and finance capitalists were not perceived
as those of the American public, it was easy for those in the republican
tradition to discern the mark of "corruption" in any measure drafted for their
benefit. "When demand was made for measures invading the spontaneous
distribution of property of industry," stated one congressman in 1822, "or
asserting despotic control of legislative power over contract. . . whether the
measures were bank bills, or tariff bills, or bankrupt bills, the demand had but
one source, the influence of some private interest or distress." 159 The Act of
1841, for example, was seen as an example of the ability of the commercial
classes, and in particular "a clique of bankrupt speculators in the city of New
York," 16° to corrupt the democratic process. One Jacksonian Democrat
charged:
[The statute] was passed under very peculiar circumstances. At the extra
session, after the bill had been laid on the table (where every one supposed it
was destined to sleep the sleep of death) by a decisive majority, the Whig
members here were entertained that evening at a certain board [Daniel
Webster's], where the sparkling champagne flowed pretty freely... and, in
the twinkling of an eye this bill ... was passed. 161
As the century progressed, corporations eclipsed merchant capitalists as the
primary threat perceived by republicans to the traditional values and the
economic stability of local community. 162 These, too, appeared favored by
federal power. Causing particular distress was the manner in which the
postbellum federal courts exerted equitable jurisdiction over railroad
insolvencies163 in a manner favoring management and equity interests over
158 31 CONG. REc. 2317 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Stewart).
159 38 ANNALs oFCONG. 983 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Archer).
160 Petition to Repeal the Bankrupt Law from Citizens of New York (Jan. 20,
1842) in Rec. H.R. 27A-G10.3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
161 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 70 (1843) (remarks of Rep. Weller); see
id. at 74 (remarks of Rep. Kennedy). This controversy was recalled at length at 31 CONG.
REC. 1856-58 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Dolliver).
162 See Louis Galambos, The Agrarian Image of the Large Corporation, 1879-1920: A
Study in Social Accommodation, 28 J. ECON. HIST. 341 (1968); Causes of Agricultural
Unrest, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Nov. 1896, at 577.
163 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISmLE RamD: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUrION iN
AMERICAN BUSINEss 134-71 (1977); HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF LAIssEZ-
FAME 24 (1951).
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local shippers. 164 This, of course, was recalled when it was proposed that
federal insolvency jurisdiction be enlarged by statute. In opposition to the Act
of 1898, the case was made that, whereas the federal courts had previously
contented themselves with managing railroads, "now it is proposed to enlarge
their business, to make them vast department stores, in which everything can
be bought and every business conducted, from a railroad down to a peanut
stand."' 165 This would permit the federal courts to "take control of the local
affairs of the people of this country . . . to build up alien power for the
protection, not of the poor, but of monopolies, trusts, and combines." 166
Bankruptcy's administrative machinery was believed not only to serve
corrupt interests, antithetical to the bedrock values of traditional community,
but indeed to create them-in the form of those bureaucratic functionaries who
were the traditional nemeses of republican virtue. 167 Much was heard from the
164 Specifically, the federal courts' adoption of the principle of "reasonable return on
investment" in receivership situations effectively shifted losses caused by overbuilding and
general mismanagement from investors to the public. The federal courts demonstrated little
sensitivity to the effects that even small differentials in freight charges could have on
producers with distant markets, and thwarted in significant ways both federal and state
attempts to regulate railroads in keeping with a more populist sensibility. As one Alabama
congressman remarked:
We know that every time these corporations go into the hands of a receiver they
are reorganized and come out with more stock and more bonds placed on the railroad.
What is the result? The men who reorganize them first get their rake-out, and then the
people along the railroad who raise the wheat, raise the cotton, and pay the freight have
to pay higher rates of freight in order to pay for the increased interest charges on
additional stocks and bonds that have been issued under the reorganization plan.
31 CONG. REC. 1795 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Underwood); see also MORTON KELLER,
AFFA Rs OF STATE: PUBLiC LI'E IN LATE NEEmEH CNTuRY AMERIcA 425-27 (1977);
EDWARD C. KIRKLAND, INDuSTRY COMES OF AGE 72 (1945); ROBERT H. WIEBE, ThE
SEARcH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 82 (1967); cf William H. Taft, Recent Criticism of the
Federal Judiciary, 5 COuNSELLOR 59 (1895). The histories of a number of individual
reorganizations are provided in STUART DAGGERT, RAiLROAD REORGANIZATION (1908).
165 31 CONGREc. 1940 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Bodine).
166 Id. at 1896 (remarks of Rep. Bland); see also id. at 1795 (remarks of Rep. Bell);
id. at 1939 (remarks of Rep. Bodine); id. at 1793, 1795 (remarks of Rep. Underwood); id.
at 1838 (remarks of Rep. Settle); id. at 1851 (remarks of Rep. Sparkman). A North
Carolina congressman concluded: "[A] proposition separate and distinct to enlarge the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts would find fewer advocates among the thinking people of
this Republic than almost any other proposition that could possibly be submitted to them."
Id. at 1862 (remarks of Rep. Linney).167 Id. at 6430 (remarks of Rep. De Armond).
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opponents of bankruptcy law about "the nibbling of mice that infest bankrupt
courts and eat all up for their own benefit," 168 those magistrates and assignees,
together with their "train of lazy dependents," 169 in whose care a bankruptcy
estate would suffer the same fate as a lump of butter in the mouth of a dog. 170
The elaborate fee structure of the 1867 Act was particularly distasteful to those
who feared the corrupting spread of dependence upon the government largess.
Recalling its operation, one congressman lamented in 1898: "[O]nly God
Almighty can find a way to relieve us from pillage by the fee fiend." 171
Held up as the most rapacious variety of courthouse vermin, however,
were the members of the bar. "Mhose who took their grists to the mills where
lawyers took the toll," concluded one House Democrat in 1841, "would have
but little reason to thank the mills or the millers." 172 Motivated purely by
prospects of personal gain, and immune to any sense of social responsibility,
lawyers would do all within their power to disrupt the harmony of interests
essential to a stable and virtuous republic. "All the army of champertors who
have ever exercised their diligence in stirring up litigation for gain," warned a
southern congressman of the 1898 Act, "would sink into comparative
insignificance in comparison with the influence of this bill as a stirrer up of
strife, a scatterer of firebrands.' 173
Even those who did not see federal courts as sinkholes of corruption,
moreover, feared they would destroy an element of the personal in economic
life. "In the State courts," observed the American Lawyer, "jurors nearly
always know the local parties." 174 In the federal courts, on the other hand,
"[t]he judges have a life tenure, the districts are large, the jurors and marshals
and court officers seldom know the suitors even by sight." 175 This bureaucratic
regime would thwart any hope of addressing business failure in a manner that
168 Id. at 1894 (remarks of Rep. Connolly).
169 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1021 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell).
170 CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Benton)
(recalling a remark by John Randolph).
171 31 CONG. REC. 1809 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Cochran); see also 16 CONG. REC.
462 (1885) (remarks of Rep. Willis).
172 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Gordon);
see also 31 CONG. Rc. 1864 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Love); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1189 (1867) (remarks of Rep. Cragin); CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 330
(1841) (remarks of Rep. Pope).
173 31 CONG. REc. 1862 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Linney); see also id. at 2315
(remarks of Sen. Stewart).
174 Henry Wollman, The New Bankruptcy Law-Its Inadequacies and Shortcomings, 6
AM. LAw. 410, 411 (1898).
175 Id.
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reflected the personal dimension of community.' 76 Asserted an opponent of the
98 Act: "[i]t eliminates sentiment and reduces business to a cold-blooded
proposition." 177
In sum, the republican detestation of federal bankruptcy administration
derived from a general fear that it would prove the entering wedge for the
intrusion of "centripetal" 178 power into local affairs, resulting in the
destruction of the traditional values and social structures upon which true
community was founded. 179 "The tendency toward centralization," it was said
in Congress in 1898, "is and has been rapid enough without encouraging it in
this manner." 180
B. The Community of Enterprise
While to republicans community entailed harmony in uniformity, the
capitalist groups celebrated interdependence in diversity. As the latter saw it,
Americans were as varied in station and occupation as their imaginations and
energies would permit, yet were nevertheless bound together as one people by
a shared spirit of enterprise and a need to cooperate in the development of a
rich and complex economy. We are "a highly commercial country," insisted
Daniel Webster, "and a highly commercial and enterprising age." 181 The line
between "genuine" Americans and others did not separate farmer from
merchant but, as one congressman stated, "the lazy, the shiftless, the drones"
from:
the great mass of our population, made up of active, intelligent, industrious,
and energetic men and women. This class is engaged in business of some kind.
The individual members are thinkers, workers, and doers. When young and
hopeful, they borrow capital, start business, set factory wheels in motion, and
make things hum. Others buy the farm on credit, and the lowing of cattle, the
bleating of sheep, and the singing of the mower and the rattle of the reaper tell
176 Wrote the editor of the Fanner's Advocate to his congressman in 1898: "[hlonest
debtors can usually compromise with fair-minded creditors and save large expenditures in
legal proceedings that had better be left in the hands of debtor and creditor than put in the
hands of emmisarys [sic] of the law." Letter from L.H. Weller to Rep. D.B. Henderson
(1898), in Rec. Sen. 52.A-J14.1., National Archives, Washington, D.C.
177 Views on the Bankrupt Law, 1 NAT'L BANKR. NEws 166 (1898).
178 2 CONG. DEB. 676 (1826) (remarks of Rep. Randolph).
179 Thus opposition to bankruptcy measures was "not directed against the bankrupt
system particularly; it [had] for its object, every exercise of power by the general
government[.]" On a National Bankrupt Law, supra note 138, at 49.
180 "Remarks of Elija B. Lewis," quoted in BANxR. MAG., Mar. 1898, at7.
181 CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 814 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Webster).
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the world that business is being done. 182
A line of thought as old as the commercial revolution posits that the strands
of mutual dependence created by commerce promote general harmony, 8 3 the
intensely social dynamic of market relations fostering a spirit of cooperation
and a sensitivity to the wants of others. 184 De Tocqueville observed that
"Trade is the natural enemy of all violent passions. Trade loves moderation,
delights in compromise, and is most careful to avoid anger." 185 Thus
commerce is the great bond of community.
However individuals might feel about the social mores associated with
commerce, moreover, the expansion and consolidation of a national market
economy was often asserted to be a matter of universal practical necessity. 186
Was it not of concern to all alike that interest and freight rates be low, goods
cheap and plentiful, and that employment opportunities expand? The
commercial elements were certain of it. "The interests of every portion of the
country are reciprocal," they insisted. 187 Even farmers did not stand apart from
this "great law of mutual dependence," 188 for the promotion of trade could
only lead to greater markets for their produce. "Show me a regulation by
which commerce is to be advanced," proclaimed one Senator in 1827, "and
you show me that by which agriculture is to be promoted." 189
While republicans cherished a localistic conception of American
community, the proponents of commercial modernity thought continentally and
presented themselves as taking up the torch of commercial unity lighted at our
182 31 CONG. REc. 1914 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Ray). Ray was the primary
author of the 1898 Act.
183 On the early history of this position, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PAssIoNs
AND THE INTERESTS: POLmCAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPrrAusM BEFORE ITs TRnMPH (1977)
and PococK, supra note 10, at 115. For other applications to the American context, see R.
KENT NEwMEYER, SUPREME COURT JusncE JOSEPH STORY 137 (1985) and DANaL W.
HOwE, PoLmcA CULTURE OF THE AMEmCAN WinGs 101 (1979).
184 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1098 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wood). For a recent
formulation of this view, see Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the
Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2, 90 AM. HIST. REv. 547 (1985).185 DE TocQuEvE, supra note 146, at 637.
186 See KOHL, supra note 6, at 64 (1989); see also CONG. GLOBE app., 26th Cong.,
1st Sess. 542-44 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Strange).
187 CONG. GLOBE app., 25th Cong., 1st Sess. 796 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Webster)
("In my judgment, all interests concur."); CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 469
(1841) (remarks of Sen. Tallmadge); see also WATSON, supra note 9, at 244.
188 Calvin Colton as quoted in KOHL, supra note 6, at 80.
189 3 CONG DEB. 204 (1827) (remarks of Sen. Hayne).
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nation's birth. 190 Bankruptcy and other measures to create a national economic
structure were, to them "part of a great and wise commercial system"
consonant with the spirit of enterprise at the root of our national character and
fundamental to the growth of national community.191 As one member of
Congress foretold in 1822:
[C]ould we be permitted to look into the vista of futurity, and behold the high
destinies of the Republic, stretching its protecting arms and extending the
influence of its Constitution and its laws to its free and happy citizens scattered
through its vast regions from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, engaged in
social intercourse, and conducting their increasing commercial operations,
facilitated by internal improvements, the necessity of uniformity in our laws
would still be more apparent. 192
If the spread of commercial culture would entail the destruction of local
traditions and established ways of thinking, moreover, the proponents of
Progress viewed such matters as more often grounded in ossified prejudice than
in reasoned values. 193 "Every important change in our social condition must
meet with opposition," stated one Whig congressman; "[ilt breaks in on
previously formed opinions and long-established habits of thinking, and must
therefore be for a while viewed with distrust, and regarded by some as a
troublesome intruder." 194
In its emphasis on transformation as progress, the linear development in
time of American society, capitalist ideology was dynamic while republicanism
190 See 31 CONG. REC. 1847 (1898) (remarks of Rep. McCall); 38 ANNALS OF CONG.
1122 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Woodson); Edwards, supra note 147, at 289; The Bankupt
Act-Shall It Be Repealed?, 1 CEN. L.J. 1 (1874); A General Bankrupt Law, supra note 60,
at 23; see also THE FEDERALSr No. 42 (James Madison).
191 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 480 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Brown);
see also REPORT OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND AcrION BY TnE [NATIONAL] BOARD [OF
TRADE] CONCERNING THE BAILEY BILL AND THE TORREY BANKRUPr BILL, S. Misc. Doc.
No. 83, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1894); CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 469
(1841) (remarks of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at 471 (remarks of Rep. Fessenden); CONG.
GLOBE app., 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 544 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Strange); id. at 803
(remarks of Sen. Dixon); 3 CONG. DEB. 169-70 (1827) (remarks of Sen. Robbins); 38
ANNALS OF CONG. 1126 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Woodson); On a National Bankrupt Law,
supra note 138, at 36; Memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of New Haven, Conn. (Jan.
4, 1820), in Rec. Sen. SEN 16A-G7, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Memorial of
Some 600 Citizens of Baltimore Praying Against the Repeal of the Bankrupt Law (Jan. 18,
1842), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3, National Archives, Washington D.C.
192 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1126 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Woodson).
193 HOwE, supra note 183, at 100-03.
194 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 482 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Brown).
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was static. So did Henry Clay, author of the "American System" of internal
improvements and assistance to industry, opine that the commercial and
industrial "system" reflects an "avidity for improvement," whereas an
agricultural system is characterized by "inertia." 195 Indeed, progress was so
esteemed by those in the Hamiltonian tradition as to justify a process of
regulatory trial and error. 196 In support of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, a Whig
delegate proposed:
Let us have a launch, I say; let us get this measure afloat; and when the craft is
once riding on its destined and proper element, if then, we find dangerous
leaks or manifest imperfections, which we shall then be better able to discover,
it will be an easy thing to haul up for repairs and improvement. 197
An irrepressible social optimism undergirded this belief in constructive
(and constructed) change as the foundation of American community. So great
was the promise of "improvement" offered by our rich continent, and so
confident were the proponents of progress in their ability to exploit that
promise, that the traditional values and settled relationships cherished by
republicans could be discarded without regret whenever they proved an
impediment. Static conceptions of community, in their view, held no attractions
to match those of the dynamic, national community of interest that lies in
pursuing Progress.
C. Preference Law and the Bonds of National Community
Within the bankruptcy debate, the divergence of views as to the time and
space dimensions of American community was given its most thorough
exposition on the subject of preferential payments, permitted in insolvency
situations by most States, but set aside in federal bankruptcy proceedings. 198
Preferences, it was said, discouraged the growth of a national credit market by
195 HENRY CLAY, Speech on the Tariff, in 2 Tm PAPERS oF HENRY CLAY: THE RISING
STATESMAN 831 (James F. Hopkins ed., 1959).
196 31 CONG. REC. 1853 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Parker).
197 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 498 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Barnard).
The alternative view was expressed by a certain congressional Democrat who commented
that "[tihe ship, I suppose, will be called the Experiment, as it is to be another [Whig]
experiment upon the business of the people." He cautioned that the "Whig Congress
[should] be warned by the fate of those who have gone before them" that such experiments
bring only "vexations and disappointments." Id. at 483 (remarks of Rep. Birdseye).
198 At the end of the nineteenth century, thirty-three states and territories allowed an
insolvent debtor to pay or secure his creditors' claims at his complete discretion, while
eighteen required some type of ratable distribution. Coles, supra note 48, at 283.
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permitting an insolvent debtor to divide his estate to benefit, over distant
lenders, a neighbor, fellow church member, or perhaps a local bank or supplier
whom the debtor hoped to do business with in the future. 199 As an Iowa
attorney wrote his congressman in 1898:
Under existing laws the bankers and jobbers here give credit to the merchants,
without taking security, under promises that they will be given the first liens in
the event of financial embarrassment. And being near their customers, their
personal influence generally secures the fulfillment of such promises to the
detriment of Eastern creditors. 200
Preferences added an element of the provincial and the personal, and hence
the unpredictable, to commercial life.201 "The insolvent and assignment laws of
the various states," the Merchants' Exchange of the City of Buffalo opined in
1884, "are in the main fiuitful sources of injustice and evil. They are local,
dissimilar and complicated." 202 So frustrating was this to out-of-state
enterprises that some concluded it was "useless to try to drum those different
states" where preferences were tolerated. 203
Of course, the personal aspect of preferential payments was precisely its
appeal to local elements, who contended that not all debts have the same moral
standing and so should not be paid upon the same priority. Those to wealthy
urban lenders, to whom a debtor is no more than an entry on a balance sheet,
are simply not as morally significant as "debts of honor" to local concerns,
199 Letter from John T. Hancock to F.C. Letts (Feb. 9, 1898), in Ree. H.R. H55-
F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
200 Letter from J.C. Gates to Rep. D.B. Henderson (Jan. 17, 1898), in Ree. H.R.
55A-F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
201 On the concept of "uncertainty discounts" as they affected American economic
development, see Lance E. Davis, The Investment Market, 1870-1914: The Evolution of a
National Market, 25 J. EcON. Hisr. 355 (1965). On the effects of provincial legislation
generally, see Thomas C. Cochran, The Paradox of American Economic Growth, 61 J. AM.
HisT. 925, 935 (1975).
202 Memorial of the Merchants' Exchange of the City of Buffalo (Apr. 15, 1884), in
Rec. H.R. 48A-H12.3-8, National Archives, Washington, D.C. "Your memorialists, as
merchants having dealings with the citizens of all the States of the Republic," stated another
commercial group in 1843, "have long felt the necessity of some uniform and stable
legislation whereby the rights and relations of debtor and creditor in all parts of the country
should be ascertained and regulated." Memorial of Lewis Conain and 160 Other Citizens of
Baltimore Praying that the Bankrupt Law May Not be Repealed (Jan. 14, 1843), in Rec.
H.R. 27A-G10.3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
203 Letter from Kawin & Co., Selling Agents, to Hon. D.B. Henderson (Dec. 17,
1897), in Rec. H.R. 55A-F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; see also Edwin S.
Mack, Bankruptcy Legislation, 28 AM L. REv. 1, 8 (1894).
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whose economic fate may be dependent upon their debtors' actions. 204 These
local lenders, indeed, may have given credit more out of personal loyalty than
hope of profit and in reliance upon a reciprocal loyalty, in the form of a
preference, if necessary.205
Preferences also appealed to the conservative individualism of certain
parochial elements. They were said to exemplify the natural law right of "a
debtor [to] the free control of a disposition of his property, in discharge of his
debts, 206 and that of the creditor to the rightful reward that comes of being
quicker in pursuit of one's interests than the next person.207 One legislator
quaintly described this latter principle as "the law of grinding at the mill-first
come first served-which was the principle of the common law and justice." 20 8
In dismissing such special pleading for preferences, the commercial
elements adverted to what they considered larger concerns of social welfare.
The "[c]ommunity at large has a heavy stake in the question," stated one
member of Congress in 1841, "as a question of morals, and a question of
political economy." 20 9 This supposed interconnection between morality and
political economy derived from the merchant attitude toward property and the
need for collective action in its protection. Being property in exchange and thus
perennially at risk, their own wealth was enhanced by any form of conduct that
bolstered the certainty of return. The preferential payment, a matter of
individual whim, had the opposite effect. Therefore, any man of commerce
who followed his own personal views of charity or social obligation in
preferring some creditors over others subverted the predictability of
commercial relations and cheated the system out of a portion of its rightful
2 04 Bankruptcy Affairs in the South, 1 BANKR. REG. 141 (1868).
205 Thus a preference could function much in the manner of the "priority lien" that
our present system permits in the administration of a bankruptcy estate. See The Bankruptcy
Law, 5 W. VA. B. 149 (1898); S.F. Kneeland, The Evolution of a Debt, 1 Tim
COUNSELLOR 1, 2 (1891); Letter from C.H. Eighmey to Hon. D.B. Henderson (Mar. 4,
1898), in Rec. H.R. 55A-F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; cf. Note, Prospect
of a Federal Bankruptcy Law, 32 AM. L. REv. 104-05 (1898); Memorial of the Merchants
and Traders of the Town of Boston to the Congress of the United States (Jan. 10, 1829), in
Rec. Sen. SEN 16A-G7, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
206 Petition of Citizens of Providence, Rhode Island for Repeal of Bankrupt Law,
(Dec. 27, 1842), in Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
207 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Gordon)
(opining that the common law aided the vigilant creditor and "left the dormant one to enjoy
the fruits of slothfulness and inglorious ease"); Iowa-Nebraska Wholesale Grocers
Association General Letter No. 77 ("Bankruptcy Bill") (Feb. 5, 1898), in Rec. H.R. 55A-
F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
208 CONG. GLOBE app., 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1841) (remarks of Rep. Gordon).
2 09 Id. at 498 (remarks of Rep. Barnard).
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returns.210 Ironically, concern for others became a form of selfishness. As one
scholar observes: "The Christian norm was replaced as a paradigm of behavior
by the commercial predictability of traders."211 Following this reasoning, an
1898 editorial in the Sioux City Tribune fulminated: "I am fully persuaded that
the opposition to a bankrupt law, at the present time, is founded upon
selfishness, such selfishness that esteems itself more than government. 212
This normative construct comports perfectly with the demands of a
capitalist political economy. 213 No standard of values is admitted beyond
individual wants, as expressed through market transactions. Self-interest is
accepted as the basis of individual conduct, so long as mediated by regulatory
mechanisms to direct that impulse toward the maximization of social wealth.
Thus "enlightened self-interest [rises] to the degree of wise statesmanship, '214
and acquisitive conduct becomes a unifying force upon which true community
can rest, not the divisive and corrupting factor posited by republicans. That the
bankruptcy proceeding exemplifies this utilitarian view of community goes far
toward explaining its role as public referendum on the capitalist presence in
American life.
VI. RESOLUTION: THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898
A. Old Conflict, New Era
The passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 brought to conclusion
congressional deliberations of extraordinary intensity. Petitions concerning the
Act, the great majority in favor, arrived from every state and territory. "Mhe
archives of Congress are crowded with petitions," stated the chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, "that have been coming to us for years." 215
The tenor of discussion could hardly have been more impassioned or the
scope more inclusive. The Act's opponents, most from regions that remained
210 "[L]aws which serve such a man do not result in the greatest good for the greatest
number[.]" HousE COMmrrE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNIUVRM SYSTEM oF BANKRUprCY
REPORT, H.R. REP No. 1228, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1897); see also Memorial of the
Chamber of Commerce of the City of Philadelphia (Dec. 9, 1819), in Rec. Sen. SEN 16A-
G7, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
211 Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History
of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. R~v. 3, 17 (1986).
212 Letter from J.C. Kelly to Hon. D.B. Henderson (Mar. 26, 1898), in Rec. H.R.
55A-F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.213 See KoHL, supra note 6, at 151.
214 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2742 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Jenckes).
215 31 CONG. REC. 1789 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Henderson).
[Vol. 55:291
MATURING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM
essentially agricultural, 216 once again unfurled the banner of agrarian localism
and carried it forward into battle against the forces of concentrated wealth and
centralized government.217 The Act, they said, was a "piratic, diabolical"
scheme of the "great plutocratic powers," intended to subvert the native virtues
of the country for good and all. It would enable the federal judiciary to
"become more dominant and powerful than ever heretofore" 218 and would
provide corporations with "extended powers and privileges which they ought
not to possess." 219 A South Dakota congressman observed:
It is perfectly apparant at this time that those who are now ruling this great
Republic intend to establish an absolute aristocratic oligarchy upon the ruins of
our free institutions, and this bill, which is two hundred years behind what we
imagined our civilization to be, is one of the instruments by which it is
attempted to be accomplished. 220
The Bill's opponents marked in all this the "corruption" that, in republican
theory, underlies all efforts to obtain special favors from government.221 One
privately published jeremiad, for example, pointed an accusing finger at
"speculators in grain and stocks who, on account of the reckless character of
their transactions [desire to] 'wipe off the slate' and be free to try it over
again." Their devious instrumentalities included "a bureau to work it up...
costly banquets given in its interests, and expensive and persistent lobbying
done to secure its passage." In distress at his country's repeated flirtations with
this form of legislation, the writer concluded with an unaccredited borrowing
from Pope:
216 See id. at 1913 (remarks of Rep. Gunn). When the "Torrey Bill," which formed
the basis for the 1898 Act, passed the House on February 19, 1898, vote by geographic
area revealed this division clearly:
Eastern States: 22 in favor to 2 against;
Middle States (New York to Maryland): 58 to 5;
Southern States: 18 to 60; and
Western States (including Midwest): 60 to 58.
Id. at 1946.
217 See, e.g., id. at 1803 (remarks of Rep. Henry).
218 Id. at 1793 (remarks of Rep. Underwood).
219 Id. at 1795 (remarks of Rep. Underwood); see also id. at 1838 (remarks of
Rep. Settle); id. at 1851 (remarks of Rep. Sparkman); id at 1939 (remarks of Rep.
Bodine).220 Id. at 1917-18 (remarks of Rep. Kelly).
221 Id. at 1806 (remarks of Rep. McRae); see also id. at 1844 (remarks of Rep.
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Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As to be hated needs but to be seen,
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace. 22 2
The Bill's supporters, for their part, insisted that it would "encourage
trade, enlarge and extend credit, build up and promote business, put active,
energetic, and brainy men at work, and add to the dignity and wealth of our
common country." 223 They equated it with the American spirit of enterprise
and capacity for fair dealing, and a willingness to join the enlightened
community of nations that had already heeded the call of commercial
modernity. 224 Its significant place in the program of the Republican Party, "the
party of hope-of humanity-of civilization," was often remarked. 225 So
apparent did it seem that this legislation represented the shining path of the
future that its detractors could only be those "who always oppose what is good
and wise in legislation as in all things, idiots and knaves."
22 6
B. The Political Organization of Capital
That this tradition of conflict would at last be resolved in favor of a
permanent system of bankruptcy administration, "to place Credit and future
commercial operations on a sound and immovable basis," 227 was the result of
changes in social and economic structure that rendered bankruptcy
administration of broader practical utility while undermining the traditional
normative arguments against it. By the 1890s, most Americans no longer made
Smith).222 N.W. Bliss, The Torrey Bankruptcy Bill-Redivivus 4 (Feb. 9, 1892), in Rec. Sen.
52A-J14.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
223 Ray, supra note 145, at 46. The Bankruptcy Magazine was published specifically to
advocate passage of the 1898 Act and was edited by Judge Jay Torrey, upon whose
proposal that Act was based.
2 2 4 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN, Doc. No. 156,
55th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1898). Judge Torrey was also the president of the National
Association of Credit Men. See Miller, supra note 46, at 71.
225 Letter from R.E. Doan to D.B. Henderson (Mar. 26, 1898), in Rec. H.R. 55A-
F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; see also Letter from J.C. Kelly to D.B.
Henderson (Mar. 26, 1898), in Rec. H.R. 55A-F19.1, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.; Letter from W.H. Boutelle to D.B. Henderson (May 26, 1897), in Rec. H.R 55A-
F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
226 Hon. George W. Ray, untitled editorial, BANKR. MAG., Oct. 1897, at 12.
227 Memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of Charleston, S.C. (Nov. 14, 1841), in
Rec. H.R. 27A-G1O.3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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their living from agriculture, and most of our national wealth came not from
farming but from commerce and manufacturing. 228 Hence measures
sympathetic to business enjoyed a growing constituency. And with the
increasingly capital intensive nature of the economy, more Americans each year
relied upon the credit system and understood its need for proper regulation. 229
Over time, additionally, the business sector had learned to take a more
systemic view of the needs of commerce and to act collectively to pursue them.
Many businessmen had supported previous bankruptcy measures, but often as
insolvents who intended to discharge their personal debts. Such measures
therefore proved highly transitory, their constituencies waning when the
failures resulting from particular economic dislocations had been addressed.
Now business, as a community of interest, took a longer view and sought to
place the relations of debtor and creditor on an ongoing, permanent basis,
informed by general principles of wealth maximization.230
In part this reflected the accrued historical experience of the business
community. Rejecting the traditional republican view of depressions as aberrant
episodes caused by speculative binges, the capitalist sector now viewed
economic dislocations as natural phenomena, like storms or hurricanes, that
occurred periodically and affected all alike. Temporary discharge mechanisms
were thus no longer sufficient; the business community recognized a collective
need for a permanent relief mechanism.
The more collective dynamic within the business community is also
attributable to the rise of certain organizational structures that acted to focus the
previously diffuse political and economic power of various groups within the
capitalist sector. An infrastructure of organizations with a long-term perspective
on regulatory matters had emerged to lobby for measures useful to business and
to protect and develop such programs once implemented. Of these
organizations, the trade association, the large corporation, and the corporate
law firm have particular relevance here.
Trade associations employ administrative processes to limit intra-member
competition. 231 The benefits of cooperation, which might be unclear to
individual members, become institutional values and are advanced by the ability
of the organization to wield the collective influence of its membership and to
228 HISTORIcAL STATISICS OFTHE UNITED STATES, U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS D57-
122 (1957).
229 L. DAvIS, AMERIcAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 34 (1972).
230 REPORT OF A SPECIAL COMMITrEE AND ACTION BY THE [NAnONAL] BOARD OF
[TRADE] CONCERNING THE BAILEY BILL AND THE TORREY BANKRuIT BILL, S. MISC. Doc.
No. 83, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1894).
231 See THEODORE J. LOWi, THE POLrrICs OF DISORDER 30, 69 (1971); see also
THEODORE J. LOWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THm SECOND REPUBUC OF THE UNrrED
STATES 27-28 (2d ed. 1979).
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delegate lobbying activities on their behalf. Accepting federal bankruptcy
administration as a means of maximizing group welfare by, among other
means, reducing costly squabbles over the assets of insolvent debtors, trade
associations and chambers of commerce played a central role in the passage of
the 1898 Act. Petitions arrived from organizations ranging in prestige from the
National Board of Trade down to the New England Drysalters' Club in such
volume as to take up six pages of fine print in the 1898 Congressional
Record.232
The rise of the large corporation also proved hospitable to federal
regulation. As one commentator stated: "The [1898 Act] is in line with
consolidation, and that is the tendency of the age and the secret of better
financial prospects." 233 Although large firms were often self-identified as
creditor elements, and so less frequently lobbied in favor of the 1898 Act than
did trade associations, their bureaucratic and actuarial dynamic eventually led
them to value the predictability brought by federal administration. 234
Changes within the legal profession had a similar influence. Big
corporations now directed their increasingly lucrative business to large
metropolitan law firms, which could provide the comprehensive legal resources
they needed. The corporate law specialist, emerging as the dominant element in
the profession,235 was disinclined to engage in litigation in far-flung hamlets
over small trade debts. Federal bankruptcy court provided the big firm lawyer
232 Note, Prospect of a Federal Bankruptcy Law, 32 AM. L. REv. 104 (1898). The
State of Missouri, for example, contributed petitions from the following groups: Associated
Wholesale Grocers of St. Louis; Business Mens Club of Joplin; Cape Girardeau Board of
Trade; Kansas City Commercial Club; Kansas City Paint, Oil and Varnish Club; Lawyers
of Sedelia; Mechanics' Exchange, St. Louis; Merchant's Exchange, St. Louis; Mexican and
Spanish-American Commercial Exchange, St. Louis; Missouri Bar Association, St. Louis;
St. Charles Board of Trade; St. Joseph Board of Trade; St. Louis Credit Men's Association;
St. Louis Furniture Board of Trade; St. Louis Paint, Oil and Drug Club; St. Louis Retail
Grocers' Association; Springfield Board of Trade; Young Men's Business Association of
Louisiana [Mo.]; Young Men's Commercial Club, Moberly; as well as others. 31 CONG.
REc. 1906 (1898).
233 Views on the Bankrupt Law, supra note 177, at 166; see also MORTON J. HoRwrrz,
TRE TRANSFORMATION OF ArmRiCAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 85 (1992).
234 Insurance companies, for example, discovered an aspect of bankruptcy
administration that not only made their losses more predictable, but in fact reduced overall
claims. With the repeal of the Act of 1867, claims for fire damage rose from eighty million
to one hundred forty million dollars a year. Half of this increase, insurers estimated, could
be attributed to a particular "moral hazard" associated with a no-bankruptcy situation.
Rather than accept forced sale of their assets without any discharge of remaining
indebtedness, many insolvents apparently succumbed to the temptation to realize a better
return on their property through arson. For a Bankrupt Act, AM. LAw., Jan. 1893, at 2.
235 See, e.g., The Decline of Litigation, AM. LAw., Nov. 1893, at 5.
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with a more convenient and neutral forum. The disproportionate influence of
corporate law firms within the American Bar Association may explain its
endorsement of the 1898 Act as "wise and beneficent legislation." 236 Local
practitioners, on the other hand, typically opposed the 1898 Act.237
The developments described above were responsible not only for the
passage of the 1898 Act but also its permanence. While previous bankruptcy
statutes had floated to enactment on the passing waves of popular demand that
attended financial panics, to be repealed upon the return of prosperity,238 the
1898 Act was supported by an ongoing constituency of groups conscious of
their vulnerability to those systemic tendencies, organized to enlist government
power in their aid.2 39
C. The Hamiltonian Dream Attained
The establishment of a permanent system of bankruptcy regulation also
reflected the extent to which geographic barriers had fallen to an expanding
network of communications and transportation. The Hamiltonian dream of an
economically integrated nation was now an accomplished reality and,
consequently, centralized economic regulation was a widely recognized
necessity.
With the post-bellum expansion in railroad building, distances that had
previously raised substantial barriers to commercial intercourse were now mere
numbers on railroad timetables, 24° while the explosion in telegraph mileage
(from 46,270 in 1867 to 190,303 in 1894) permitted information to flow
instantly from coast to coast.241 The progress of capitalist development had
truly "annihilated.. .space with time." As one Massachusetts congressman
stated:
The telegraph, the telephone, and the frequent and fast-flying mails have
almost annihilated distance, and our nearly 180,000 miles of railroad enable us
now in an incredibly short space of time to transfer from one state to another
great masses of freight and merchandise which one hundred years ago were as
immovable as mountains. The marvelous instrumentalities of modem
236 3 LAw NoTEs 202 (1900).
237 See Letter from J.C. Gates to D.B. Henderson (Jan. 17, 1898), in Rec. H.R. 55A-
F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
238 The Bankrupt Law, the Mischief and the Remedy, Damorr TRiB., Feb. 25, 1876,
at 1.
239 he Bankruptcy Law Again, 4 LAw NOms 1 (1900).
2 40 ALAN TRACHTIENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMEmCA 59 (1982).
241 The number of telegrams sent increased from 5,879,282 to 58,632,237 over the
same period. H.R. REP. No. 1228, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1897).
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commerce, undreamed of one hundred years ago, have compelled us to become
commercially one people. State lines are eliminated. 242
As a result of these changes, centrally administered firms now penetrated
all areas of the nation, and the values of the most advanced elements within the
business community were quickly disseminated everywhere. 243 The result was
an increasingly homogenous and integrated commercial world. The bonds of
our commercial union, asserted the Detroit Tribune, "are even stronger than
those of our political union."244
Capital markets, too, became more sophisticated and took on a national
quality.245 "Credit is not sectional," observed one Iowa Republican, "it is
national." 24 6 Investment banking firms, mortgage companies, mutual savings
banks, and building and loan associations directed capital to its most productive
uses, wherever located. Capital mobility was further enhanced by the evolution
of the correspondent banking system, which permitted the free transfer of
credits among networks of banks, and by the use of the telegraph to speed
communication between financial institutions. 247
The expansion of the credit system was further fueled by the increased
availability of credit information on prospective borrowers. 248 By the end of
the century, the Mercantile Agency (predecessor to Dun & Bradstreet) and its
imitators had established an industry in infonmation.24 9 In addition, city banks
now routinely conducted credit investigations of prospective borrowers as a
service to their corresponding banks in small towns.250
Federal bankruptcy administration was a logical outgrowth of these
developments in transportation, finance and commercial organization. 25 1 Many
242 31 CONG. RPc. 1847 (1898) (remarks of Rep. McCall).
243 See generally HAROLD BARGER, DISTRIBUTION's PLACE IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY SINCE 1869 3-6 (1955); T. BENiGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION 187 (1986);
CHANDLER, supra note 163, at 289; Bous EMME & JOHN E. JENCK, CATALOGUES AND
CouNrERs: A HISTORY OF SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY 15 (1950); KRKLAND, supra
note 164, at 264-67; FRED A. SHANNON, THE FARME 's LAsT FRONTER 349 (1966).244 Quoted in BANKR. MAG., Mar, 1898, at 30.
245 See JONATHON HuGHES, THE VrrAL FEw 360 (1966).
246 31 CONG. REC. 1790 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Henderson).
247 See generally JOHN A. JAMES, MONEY AND CAPrrAL MARKETS IN POsTBELLUM
AMERICA 124-25 (1978).
248 The Best Managed Credit Department in the World, 1 NAT'L BANKR. NEws 13
(1898).
249 See RoY A. FouLKE, TIm SINEWS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 275-302 (1941).
250 See CHEsmA. PHmLis, BANK CREDrr 148-49 (1931).
251 See 31 CONG. REC. 1916 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Ray); id. at 1789 (remarks of
Rep. Henderson).
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corporations had grown so geographically extensive and financially complex
that to administer their bankruptcies through a jumble of overlapping and
conflicting state court actions was obviously impractical. Further, the
administrative resources necessary to adequately address their insolvencies
were beyond what many states could muster.
The limitations of local regulation in a national economy were particularly
well illustrated by the changing position of the preference. By the end of the
century, preferences no longer appeared an effective bastion of the local and
personal in business life.252 To those who asserted that federal bankruptcy law
was a scheme to allow the Eastern monied interests to defeat the time-honored
ability of local creditors to satisfy their claims first under state grab laws, it was
now replied that the East no longer derived any such advantage from
bankruptcy measures. Stated the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee:
[T]he farther away the creditor may be the sharper will be his watchfulness. He
will have his collection agents or attorneys near the debtor with a watchful eye
upon his interests and will exercise greater vigilance than the nearer creditor
will. In addition to this, the difference between location of creditors is
destroyed by the wonderful facilities that now exist for sending telegrams and
for speedy modes of travel between all parts of the country. The Eastern
creditor can send a telegram to his attorneys which will put him on the ground
as quickly as the nearer creditor.253
An important advantage of provincial creditors, better information about
their debtors, had indeed diminished with changing business practices.
Organizational efficiency was replacing geographic proximity as the critical
factor. "In nearly every town in the United States," it was declared,
"mercantile agencies are established, and a failure or fraudulent transfer of
property in a remote town in Texas is known as soon in New York or Boston
as in the town itself." 254 The large dry goods houses maintained their own
credit reporting systems, which were often superior to those of local banks in
monitoring their mutual debtors.255 "[Tlheir system of espionage is perfect,"
observed one member of Congress, and when insolvency threatened, they
secured "a preference in the shape of a mortgage, chattel or otherwise, or the
unfortunate debtor is closed up."256 For that reason, Marshall Field &
2 5 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL AssoCIATION OF CREDrr MEN, S. Doc. No. 156,
55th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1898); Letter from John Hancock & Sons to F.C. Letts (Feb. 2,
1898), in Rec. H.R. H55-F19.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
253 31 CONG. REc. 1789 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Henderson) (emphasis added).
254 16 CONG. REc. 461 (1885) (remarks of Rep. Moulton).
255 The Best Managed Bank Credit Department in the World, supra note 248, at 13.
256 31 CONG. REC. 1839 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Alexander); see also id. at 1835
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Company was the most energetic opponent of the 1898 Act, going to the length
of distributing to its customers "machine protests" against the Act, to be signed
and mailed to Congress.257
Because their recipients were now so often the forces of concentrated
capital, preferential payments could no longer be said to satisfy local "debts of
honor" ahead of other claims.2 58 Thus had another aspect of the individual in
American life fallen to the onrush of progress. Although it was said that the
1898 Act eliminated the personal aspects of business relations, 259 in truth it
merely reflected the impersonal social dynamic that a maturing capitalism
brought in its train.
D. The Decline of Economic Individualism
As America conformed more each day to the Hamiltonian ideal, the
traditional bastions of the virtuous republic seemed not merely under attack by
an ever-increasing tide of corruption, but in fact subverted by social changes
that stripped them of all practical relevance. The republican ideal of economic
individualism had become problematic in an era of giant corporations, trusts
and pools, when uncountable young men had "fallen under the wheels of the
Standard Oil Company, or.. . contributed to the success of that monstrous
iniquity, throughout their lives, from the need of taking employment wherever
they could find it." 260 Who could trust in principles of small producer
democracy when the economy was seen as a vast engine disposed toward the
destruction of the common man?261 Big capital demanded big government to
protect the citizenry, not wistful paeans to the independent yeoman.262
Among the traditional elements of economic individualism, the natural law
(remarks of Rep. Moody).
257 See id. at 1902-04 (remarks of Rep. Grosvenor); id. at 1835 (remarks of Rep.
Moody); Declared to Be a Miserable Compromise, 1 NAT'L BANKR. NEWs 5 (1898).
The McCormick Harvesting Machine and Wilson Sewing Machine companies had
likewise penetrated local economic life so completely as to prefer state to federal regulation
of insolvency. 16 CONG. REc. 461 (1885) (remarks of Rep. Moulton).
258 Note, supra note 232, at 105.
259 Views on the Bankrupt Law, supra note 177, at 66.
260 Moses Hallett, The Private Corporation in Sociology, in REPORT OF Tm CoLoRADo
BAR AssOCATION 118, 122 (1899). On the changes in American social mores caused by the
increasingly dominant position of the corporation, see OLivER ZUNZ, MAKING AMERIcA
CoRPoRATE: 1870-1920 (1990).
261 See 31 CONG. REC. 1797 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Lanham).
262 See MARTjN J. SKLAR, TnE Coi, oRATm REcoNsTRucnoN oF AMERIcAN
CAPrFAUSM, 1890-1916: 'i1m MARKEr, THE LAw, AND PoLmcs 180 (1988); JoHN A.
GARRATY, TmE NEW COMMONWEALTH, 1877-1890 ch. 1 (1968).
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view of contract was particularly undermined by the consolidating tendency of
the age. When "all are interdependent and none are independent," 263 assertions
that contracts represent the morally inviolable product of individual free will,
so long deployed in opposition to federal debt relief measures, become
implausible. Whether a farmer shipping produce to market or a factory
employee, the individuals situation in a modem commercial economy is too
obviously influenced by forces he or she can do little to control through private
bargain.
Further, the frequency with which corporations were now parties to
contracts proved additionally unsettling to a "free will" view of obligation.
Speaking of the "will" of a corporation smacks of fiction.2 64 Moreover, the
very purpose of the corporate form-to encourage capital formation through the
enticement of limited liability-flies in the face of absolutist conceptions of
contract rights. Indeed, because the law enforces corporate obligations only to
the extent of corporate assets, the corporate form acts as a prospective method
of debt relief. "The law of their incorporation is or should be bankrupt law
enough for them," a Senate report remarked when it was proposed that
corporations be granted the benefits of bankruptcy.265
The largest nail in the sacred coffin, however, was delivered by post-
bellum monetary policy. In a move back toward the gold standard, Republican
administrations retired a portion of the greenbacks issued to finance the Civil
War, causing currency deflation and the resulting practical appreciation of
existing debts.266 Foremost among the debtor elements hurt by this
development were farmers.267 This provided an object lesson in the political
dimension of contract. Not only did it now appear that the individual's ability
to perform his obligations was affected by macroeconomic forces beyond his
control, as the commercial sectors had long insisted, but the very amount of his
debts, determined in dollars of constant buying power, rose and fell with such
influences. This year's dollar was an entirely different thing from next year's.
"The change in the currency from year to year has been so great, so violent,"
263 Benjamin A. Richmond, The New Feudalism, 6 AM. LAW. 413, 414 (1898); see
also ERNsr FREUND, THE LEGAL NATuRE OF CORPORAnTONS (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press 1897).
264 On the mysterious nature of corporate intent and conduct, see TRAC-TENBERG,
supra note 240, at 84; HORwrrz, supra note 233, at 65-108.
265 H.R. REP. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1841).
2 66 See ALLAN G. BoGuE, MONEY AT hRs 2 (1955); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA
SCHWARTZ, A MONErARY HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATEs: 1867-1960, at 32-48 (1963);
SHANNON, supra note 243, at 184-88.
267 See SHANNON, supra note 243, at 126-48; Everett E. Edwards, American
Agriculture-The First 300 Years, in FARims IN A CHANGING WORLD: YEARBOOK OF
AGRICULTURE, 1940, H.R. Doc. No. 695, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 260-65 (1940).
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one senator had noted in 1867, "that the word 'dollar' in which all contracts
are made and in which they must be enforced, has been continually changing in
its meaning." 268
Populists and Democrats responded by advocating a policy of "free silver"
intended not only to increase the amount of specie in circulation, but also to fix
its value in relation to gold in such a way as to cheapen the dollar and reverse
the transfer of wealth effect of previous deflationary policies, so that now
debtors would be the gainers.269 However designated, this was nothing else but
a federal program of debt relief. Thus the farm sector implicitly acknowledged
that contractual duty could in no literal sense be absolute, being always relative
to a matrix of other factors that rendered its ethical force conditional upon the
normative justice of the political and economic backdrop.270
Because the bankruptcy debate brought these disturbing changes in the
polity into high relief, opposition to the Act took on a last-stand urgency for
those in the republican tradition. As the utility of bankruptcy relief became ever
more apparent, however, the connection between defeating the Act and any
practical defense of the "one genuine America," became elusive, a matter more
of symbol than substance. As illustration, in mourning the passing of our
national virtue one Nevada senator drew a parallel between bankruptcy
legislation and the decline of the Roman Empire, supported with quotations
from Brooks Adam's, The Law of Civilization and Decay.271 Similarly, the
congressman who described the 1898 Act as part of the plan of the rich and
powerful to "crucify this nation on a cross of gold" did not mean to assert a
direct conflict between bankruptcy law and free silver monetary policy. 272
Rather, he invoked the most compelling image from the iconography of
agrarian populism to denounce what he saw as a general and highly symbolic
legislative endorsement of a diverse, pluralistic, capitalist society to be erected
268 12 CONG. REC. 949 (1867) (remarks of Sen. Doolittle); see also 31 CONG. REC.
1807 (1898) (remarks of Rep. McRae).
269 See FRiEDMAN & ScawARTz, supra note 266, at 45-115.
By the 1890s, this form of federal debt relief was seen by many farmers as a panacea
for all of their ills. KELLER, supra note 164, at 571-87; RicHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE
OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 60-94 (1955); see also Richard Hofstadter,
Introduction to WILIAM H. HARVEY, CoiN's FINANCIAL ScHoOL (Richard Hofstadter ed.,
1963).
270 Cf. 31 CONG. REC. 1845 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Smith). On the shift away from
an absolutist view of contract generally, see Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE
L.J. 454 (1909).
271 31 CONG. RC. 2315 (1898) (remarks of Sen. Stewart).
272 Id. at 1806 (remarks of Rep. Henry). Also raising the free silver issue in the
bankruptcy debate were: id. at 1862 (remarks of Rep. Kitchen); id. at 1889 (remarks of
Rep. Sulzer); id. at 1912 (remarks of Rep. Gunn); id. at 2316 (remarks of Sen. Stewart).
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upon the ashes of the Jeffersonian ideal.
VII. CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy debate revealed with unique clarity the inner workings of
two opposed social paradigms that deeply informed nineteenth century
American life. One of these, derived from the experience of a pre-capitalist,
essentially agricultural polity, defended a closed and largely static system of
political economy. Conservative in the most literal sense of the term, it
cherished that which already was and had proved itself good, that which could
be touched and freely exchanged, that which carried familiar names and knew
how to stay where it belonged. It resisted the rootless, the too quick and easy,
the illusory, and, quite often, simply the new.
Standing in opposition was a social philosophy derived from the
commercial experience. Faith in the progressive effects of acquisitive activity,
and in a national unity of interest in the hegemony of commercial culture, were
its fundamental tenets. Its view of state power was positivist and utilitarian.
Both traditions of thought were democratic in their stated intention to
promote the will of the people. Both were liberal in their support for the
unhampered economic striving of the populace. That they argued to different
conclusions from a shared political vocabulary was the result of the divergent
meanings that different modes of material life imparted to such abstractions as
the rights of property and contract, individual economic freedom and national
community.
It is fitting that developmental capitalism and federal bankruptcy
administration came to maturity during the same period of American history.
Bankruptcy exemplifies the basic premises of developmental capitalism: the
elimination of the personal from economic life, the abstraction of property
interests into market values, and the regulation of commerce from a purely
utilitarian standpoint. Moreover, it stands upon many of the same institutional
underpinnings, including a modem credit system. This congruence, as we have
seen, did not escape the notice of the American people, who addressed the
issue of bankruptcy as going to the essence of our national economic identity.
Thus our endorsement of federal bankruptcy administration signalled an
acceptance of commercial modernity, in the fullest sense, as our national
destiny.
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